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## THREE WEEKS TO GO AND THERESA MAY HEADING FOR A BIG WIN

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### EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

\*Theresa May is headed for a very big victory. The election has been called because she wants a big majority for her policies rather than administer a manifesto left behind by David Cameron. All the evidence shows that she should end up with an overall majority of more than 100 seats in Parliament and up to 400 MPs.

\*Labour headed for its worst defeat since 1935. Even if Jeremy Corbyn wins a bigger vote than Michael Foot, changes in party competition will leave Labour with fewer MPs than in its disastrous 1983 election showing. Moreover, it will do well to finish less than 200 seats behind the Conservatives.

\*Liberal Democrat critics of Brexit will gain a few seats but little voice. There are only half a dozen seats where the pro-remain referendum vote was so high that it could help the party unseat an incumbent MP. Polling evidence shows little national swing to the party from 2015 and in seats where it is second it trails well behind the incumbent MP.

\*Scottish National Party chastened not stopped. Because it won 56 of Scotland's 59 seats in the last election, the SNP is vulnerable to losing up to half a dozen to the anti-independence Conservatives. It will remain the party with the most Scottish votes and the third largest party at Westminster.

\*Brexit producing UKXIT, that is, a collapse in support for the UK Independence Party. More than half of those who gave UKIP their vote two years ago now favour the Conservatives. This will help the Tories win marginal seats from Labour, especially in constituencies in which UKIP does not field a candidate.

\*Changes in opinion polls not evidence of a big shift in votes. Statistical analysis shows that during the campaign to date there has been no significant trend up or down in support for the Conservatives, Liberal Democrats and UKIP parties. There has been a significant but small trend up in Labour support from the very low base that encouraged Theresa May to call the election. Even if the trend up continues, Jeremy Corbyn would be doing well to match the party's vote at the last election. Even then, Labour would lose seats because Conservative support has risen substantially.

\*More than five-sixths of MPs will be elected on pro-Brexit manifestos. In the new Parliament, the most pro-EU parties, the SNP and the Liberal Democrats, will together have less than one-eighth of all MPs.

## 1. WHY A GENERAL ELECTION?

A prime minister has more to lose than anyone else by calling a general election, because she or he already has the highest office in British government. With a Conservative majority of 98 seats over the Labour Party and a term of office not due to expire for three years, Theresa May had no fear of being upset by the official Opposition. Although the government has had a small majority, it would have taken a coalition of Conservative defectors and unity among MPs from up to eight Opposition parties to carry a vote of no confidence in the Conservative government.

Theresa May has called a general election on 8<sup>th</sup> June for three good reasons. Foremost is the desire to make the Conservative government *her* government rather than one elected on a manifesto prepared by David Cameron. Secondly, opinion polls and by-election results promise a June ballot will give her a big parliamentary majority. Thirdly, Theresa May needs a personal mandate for managing Britain's withdrawal from the European Union, because she voted remain in the EU referendum while most Conservative voters cast their ballot for leaving. Before the end of next year, the Prime Minister will need the approval of her Cabinet, and parliamentary party and both houses of Parliament for the terms she gets from Brussels before the UK ceases to be an EU member state in March, 2019. The terms may be for a hard Brexit, a soft Brexit, or no deal with Brussels.

Opinion polls promise that the Conservative lead in votes will widen thanks to the return from UKIP ranks of former supporters who welcome May's commitment to Brexit. Concurrently, Theresa May leads a party that Ukipers recognise as their party. Labour under Jeremy Corbyn is finding it difficult to regain the votes and seats lost at the last general election. However, the number of seats gained for each one percent increase in votes does not automatically translate into a similar gain in seats. The Conservative lead of 6 percent lead in votes at the 2015 election produced a lead of less than 2 percent over opposition MPs.

Theresa May will benefit from the House of Commons having more of *her* MPs. Conservatives gaining seats from Opposition parties are doing so by appealing for support for her as a strong leader in Brexit negotiations. The same is true of Conservative candidates replacing incumbent MPs who are retiring or, like George Osborne, leaving the Commons because they are out of favour with Downing Street. Re-elected Tory MPs who held or won their seats at the last election by sitting on the fence will return committed to the leader's slogan "Brexit means Brexit".

Up to a point, the manifesto on which the Prime Minister is fighting the general election will show what Brexit means by setting out red-line conditions that should be met by any agreement she will approve. The manifesto should also indicate what scope Downing Street sees for negotiations with the European Union. The Labour manifesto accepts the referendum result too. Together, these commitments give little encouragement to those who would like the next Parliament to call a second referendum on the terms of withdrawal after negotiations conclude next year.


## 2. COMPETING PARTIES

Winning a British general election outright requires a party to gain an absolute majority of the 650 seats in the House of Commons. Doing so does not require the victorious party to win a majority of the vote. No governing party has won an absolute majority of votes since 1935 because the total is divided among many competing parties. Since February, 1974, third parties, a term that lumps together Liberal Democrats, nationalist parties, Greens, UKIP and others, have regularly won between one-quarter and one-third of the national vote.

To win a seat in the British first-past-the-post electoral system requires a candidate to secure a plurality of votes in a constituency, that is, one more than any other candidate. At the 2015 general election, there was an average of six candidates per constituency. In consequence, the great majority of seats were won by an MP with a plurality rather than an absolute majority of votes. For example, in a four-way fight in the Welsh constituency of Ynys Mon Labour won with only 31 percent of the vote.

The bias in the electoral system tends to give a disproportionate number of seats to the parties winning the most votes. As the party with a plurality of votes nationally in 2015, Conservatives enjoyed the biggest advantage; it gained its absolute majority in the Commons with just under 37 percent of the popular vote. Labour also benefited, albeit to a lesser degree, winning more than a third of MPs with less than a third of the popular vote (Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1 THE RELATION OF VOTES AND SEATS, 2015 UK ELECTION



Source: All election statistics calculated from House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP7186, *General Election 2015*.

The ability of a party to win seats depends on how its vote is spread among the UK's 650 constituencies. A party that wins a small share of the UK vote can win a disproportionate number of MPs if it concentrates its vote. The Scottish National Party consistently does just this. It won half the vote in Scotland in 2015, but because it does not contest seats outside Scotland, this was only 4.7 percent of the UK vote. The United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) suffered most, because its support has been spread relatively evenly throughout the country. Its 13 percent share of the national vote in 2015 won it only one MP. The Liberal Democrats are perennially penalized by the electoral system. At the last election the party's eight percent of the popular vote secured it just over one percent of Commons' seats.

In today's multi-party system, the calculation of a uniform nationwide swing in votes between from Labour and the Conservatives is no longer a reliable guide to estimating seats changing hands, because general elections are no longer general. At the 2015 general election third parties won 88 seats, UKIP came second in 120 seats and the Liberal Democrats came second in dozens more.

Instead of party competition being uniform throughout the country, the competitive strength of parties differs between parts of the UK (Table 2.1). This is most evident in Northern Ireland, where 95 percent of the vote goes to a variety of Unionist and Irish Republican parties. In Scotland, five Unionist parties compete with the SNP. In Wales the two largest British parties take 64 percent of the vote but seats are divided among four parties. Party competition also varies within England. In the South of England, the Conservatives won more than double Labour's share of the vote and 247 seats against 51 for Labour at the last election. By contrast, in London the Labour Party won a plurality of votes and 45 of its 73 MPs. In the North of England Labour won 12 percent more of the vote than the Conservatives and took 110 seats against 44 for its Tory opponents.

Table 2.1 PARTY COMPETITION VARIES WITHIN THE UK

	Con	Lab	LibD	UKIP	Green	Other	Nat	Seats
	(% votes 2015)							
South of England	47.2	23.5	9.0	15.1	4.4	0.8	0	302
London	34.9	43.7	7.7	8.1	4.9	0.8	0	73
North of England	30.7	43.1	6.7	15.0	3.4	1.0	0	158
Wales	27.2	36.9	6.5	13.6	2.6	1.0	12.1	40
Scotland	14.9	24.3	7.5	1.6	1.3	0.3	50.0	59
N. Ireland	1.3	0	0	2.6	0	1.0	95.1	* 18

\*Includes both Unionists and Irish Republican parties

Source: All election statistics calculated from House of Commons Briefing Paper CBP7186, General Election 2015. North of England regions: North East, North West, Yorkshire & Humberside. South of England: South East, South West, East.

The over and under representation of parties at the forthcoming election is already baked into the system. The Conservatives will again be substantially over-represented in the Commons and the same will be the case for the SNP. Labour's loss of seats will undermine its former over-representation. An increase in votes for the Liberal Democrats will once again leave the party with fewer seats than its national vote would entitle it to in a system of proportional representation.

### 3. WINNING VOTES

Political events since the last election have had an impact on support for all parties. In more than 160 polls taken since the last election, the Conservatives have consistently come first (see <http://Ukpollingreport.co.uk>). Instead of experiencing a mid-term slump in support, the Conservatives have enjoyed a big mid-term boost. Immediately after the EU referendum, the Conservatives averaged a lead of only five percentage points over Labour. Once Theresa May became prime minister the Conservative lead over Labour grew to a double digit figure. In two polls taken a week before Theresa May announced the election, the Conservatives enjoyed a 21 percent lead over Labour. Under Jeremy Corbyn the Labour Party quickly suffered a drop in support from its vote at the 2015 election. Since then, Labour support has tended to be steady but it has yet to reach the point at which it lost the 2015 election. Concurrently, the Liberal Democrats have seen a small recovery in poll support. UKIP has suffered the biggest loss. Since the EU referendum delivered Brexit, its support has more than halved.

The boost in Conservative support reflects the party's capacity to hold on to its 2015 voters while simultaneously picking up supporters from other parties and from those who did not vote at the last election. In its latest *Sunday Times* poll, YouGov found that 89 percent who had voted Conservative in 2015 were ready to vote for the party again. Only 5 percent had defected to the Liberal Democrats and 4 percent to Labour. Of the fifth of voters that Labour has lost, three have gone Conservative for every two that have switched to the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats have lost 44 percent of their previous supporters and two-thirds of these defectors have gone to the Conservatives. As for UKIP, 69 percent who reported voting for the party at the last election say they will now vote Conservative compared to 23 percent intending to vote UKIP again. The small proportion of UKIP voters who have defected to Labour have not been replaced by Labour defections to UKIP.

Taken at its face value, the size of the Conservative lead explains why Theresa May saw little risk of losing the government's parliamentary majority by calling a June election. However, an election campaign creates a new situation. Questions about voting intentions become less hypothetical as election day approaches. During the election campaign, non-party groups and the media encourage every elector to vote as a civic duty. However, poll evidence indicating that the outcome is a foregone conclusion encourages the view that there is no point in bothering to vote. Moreover, local electioneering has drained the energies of many grass-roots party workers and internal party differences have demoralized Labour and UKIP activists.

By mid-May those who tell pollsters they are undecided now represent less than one-sixth of the electorate, according to the latest YouGov survey. Among the 6 percent of undecided who say which party they are inclined to favour, the Conservatives outnumber those inclined toward Labour by a margin of 4 to 3. Among those 9 percent who at present appear unlikely to vote, past party history indicates they almost evenly divided between the two biggest parties. Before election day, each of the party leaders is scheduled to make at least one television appearance. However, judgments of who has “won” a TV debate make a 24 hour headline reflecting prior partisan inclinations. It would take an extraordinary gaffe by a leader to disrupt how the parties are evaluated.

As the election campaign progresses more polls are published, with the result of creating more “noise”, that is, changes in the support for the front-running parties that reflect random fluctuations of up to three percent that are inevitable in the sampling procedures that polls use. When the fluctuations are in opposite directions, this creates the appearance of a change of up to five or six percent in the gap between the parties even though there is actually no change in the electorate as a whole.<sup>1</sup> A least squares regression line can indicate whether there has been a significant trend up or down in in the 36 polls to date to since the election was called.

Figure 3.1 plots the results of 36 nationwide polls taken since the general election was called on 18 April. The calculations show:

\*Conservative support is high and steady. Because the party started out at a high level, the slight upward trend in support plotted in Figure 3.1 is not statistically significant. Since the election was called in mid-April, Conservative support has more or less randomly fluctuated between 40 and 50 percent. In the 11 most recent polls since the local elections of 4 May, the party’s support has fluctuated between 44 and 49 percent.

\*Labour has enjoyed a significant upward trend from 24 percent, its poll position when the election was called. The underlying trend since then has been an increase of 5.5 percent, bringing it close the position when it lost the 2015 general election. Since local elections, Labour’s support in the polls has fluctuated between 27 and 32 percent.


\*The Liberal Democrats’ national support has fluctuated between 8 and 12 percent. There is an underlying trend downwards in its support and it is statistically significant. Its stance as the only party unambiguously in favour of maintaining close ties with the EU has not been a vote winner.

\*UKIP’s big fall in support started well before the general election was called and has followed a significant downward path since to 5 percent, with the prospect of a further fall in its national vote on election day because it is not fielding candidates in hundreds of constituencies.

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<sup>1</sup>. See Richard Rose, “Opinion Polls and Election Results”. In Rose, ed., Studies in British Politics (3<sup>rd</sup> edition, 1976), 305-322.

Figure 3.1 TRENDS IN VOTING INTENTIONS: 19 APRIL – 13 MAY



Source: Wikipedia Opinion polling for the United Kingdom general election, 2017.

#### 4. TURNING VOTES INTO SEATS

The decisive question on election night is: How many seats has each party won? The answer cannot be read off from national opinion polls but only by adding up the results in 650 constituencies. Even though her power as Prime Minister is at risk, Theresa May can only contribute one seat, Maidenhead, to the total she needs for a good result, that is, substantially more seats than David Cameron had in 2015.

All parties target their campaign effort at marginal seats; these are conventionally defined as seats where their candidate finished second by 10 percent or less. In a complementary manner, they also offer additional support to incumbent MPs who hold or won their seat by a similar margin. As constituencies become socially and politically more homogeneous, the number of marginal seats has been contracting. At the forthcoming election, more than four-fifths of constituencies are held by a margin of more than ten percent.

If the Conservatives are to achieve a lead of more than 100 seats over the combined forces of all Opposition parties, they will need to win nine-tenths of their 51 target seats (Table 4.1). If Labour is to avoid its worst result since 1983, it will need to hold all the vulnerable seats it is defending by a margin of more than five percent. If Labour wants to avoid dropping its representation below 200 MPs, it will need to hold all the marginal seats in which it has a lead of more than 7 percent. The Liberal Democrats and the Scottish National Party are fighting wars on two fronts. The Liberal Democrats have more target seats they hope to gain because they did so badly at the last election, while being vulnerable to losing some of the 8 MPs they now have. The SNP is in the opposite situation: Only three of its seats are held by a margin of less than 10 percent and it is the challenger in three seats that its opponents hold by margins of less than 6 percent. Even though UKIP came second in 120 seats at the last election, there are only 3 seats in which it finished within 10 percent of an incumbent.

The Conservative and Liberal Democrat candidates have a special opportunity to appeal for cross-party support from voters who are dissatisfied with the position on Brexit of the party they supported at the last election. In England and Wales, a majority voted to leave the EU in 401 constituencies while 172 registered a majority for remaining. Nonetheless, In ten Conservative- held seats, more than 66 percent voted to remain in the EU. In only one Liberal Democrat seat was there a majority for Brexit, while in 16 of its target marginals there was a majority for remaining in the EU.

Table 4.1 TARGET AND VULNERABLE SEATS OF PARTIES

	Target (10% behind)	Vulnerable (10% or less ahead)
Con	51	57
Labour	48	49
Lib Dem	16	7
UKIP	3	0
SNP	3	6




Because there are a multiplicity of candidates in every constituency, the winner took at absolute majority of the vote, thus making the sitting MP invulnerable to change if he or she can hold on to the support they had at the last election. In more than half their seats, 171, the incumbent Conservative MP had an absolute majority at the last election. By contrast, Labour MPs have an absolute majority of the vote in 107 seats, less than half their total. The SNP won 35 seats with more than 50 percent of the constituency vote, while the Liberal Democrats have only one seat that is so safe. In seats held by a plurality of the vote, it is arithmetically possible for a grand coalition of opponents to combine their votes behind one candidate and unseat an MP. However, national party headquarters are against a formal pact and so are many constituency activists. Nor is it necessary for this to be done, since voters can decide to vote tactically for their second best choice in order to prevent the party they most dislike winning. This is most likely to be effective in seats in which the sitting MP won with less than 40 percent of the vote two years ago. In 16 Conservative-held marginals the Tory MP took less than 40 percent of the vote, and the same is the case for 15 Labour MPs.

The outcome in marginal seats is determined by the net effect of the movement of voters between up to half a dozen parties contesting a constituency. Because of the variety of motivations and party choices on offer, most seats do not change hands because of a pendulum-like swing of Labour voters to Conservative ranks or vice versa. In the latest YouGov survey showing an 18 percentage point Conservative lead over Labour, less than one percent of the Tory advantage was due to the net effect of respondents saying they had switched between the two parties. Most of the net change in party support is due to movements in and out of the Liberal Democratic ranks and the collapse of UKIP. For example, for every three voters the Conservatives have lost to the Liberal Democrats, they have won five from UKIP defectors.

In the 11 polls interviewing after the 4 May local elections, the Conservatives have had the support of an average of 48 percent of respondents, compared to Labour averaging 30 percent (Figure 4.1). Conservative support has gone up so much more than Labour because it has been able to squeeze the vote of UKIP and the Liberal Democrats have failed to make a significant national gain in support. Thus, the combined vote for third parties is likely to be under a quarter at the forthcoming election, instead of the customary third or more of the vote.

Assessing the likely change in the number of MPs that each party wins at the forthcoming election must take into account the margin by which a seat is currently held; the pattern of party competition in the constituency; and national support for each party. Because the forthcoming election is so near the previous ballot, the partisan effects of demographic changes in the electorate are slight. The combination of these influences is used to estimate the number of seats each party will win at the 8 June election, if no significant change occurs in opinion polls reported in Figure 4.1.

Figure 4.1 PARTY SUPPORT FOR CURRENT POLLS



Source: Means from 11 published British polls interviewing since local elections on 4 May. Since surveys do not cover Northern Ireland, the change calculations are based on the 2015 division of the vote in Great Britain with an allowance for UKIP's failure to contest 247 seats.

*Conservative opportunities.* The uniform application of opinion poll estimates of the big increase in the Conservative vote and a slight fall in the Labour vote is that the party would win 56 seats in which it trailed the incumbent MP by 11 percent or less two years ago. Seven-eighths of these seats are held by Labour MPs. In a few seats a combination of three things--a large ethnic vote, a very high referendum vote for remaining in the EU, and a low UKIP vote in 2015 may enable some Labour MPs to hold on. However, in 13 of the 24 seats where the Conservatives are behind the incumbent by a margin of between 11 and 15 percent, the UKIP vote was above the share it won nationally two years ago. Moreover, in 15 of these constituencies the percentage vote for leaving the European Union was above the national figure, including 11 in which the vote to leave the EU was above 60 percent. Theresa May is specially targeting these Labour-held seats, many in the North of England, are the seats Theresa May is targeting.

*Corbyn's mixed impact.* The Labour leader's strategy of mobilizing core trade union voters appears to have attracted enough fresh support to offset the loss the party

incurred when he first became leader. Nor will it avoid a loss in seats that will bring Labour its fewest MPs since 1935. Among those who voted Labour in 2015, almost half have defected to other parties or to the ranks of the undecided. Moreover, Labour's confusing position on the EU and devolution match the party's internal division between its metropolitan pro-EU supporters and anti-EU voters and devolved parties in Scotland and Wales and at Westminster. Thus, it is vulnerable to losing two seats to the Liberal Democrats, one to Plaid Cymru and its only Scottish seat.

*Liberal Democrats still weak also rans.* The Liberal Democrat fall in votes was so great in 2015 that there are only 21 seats in which they finished second with as much as 30 percent of the vote and only three of its eight MPs were elected with two-fifths or more of the vote. In the seven seats the party is defending with margins of less than ten percent, the Conservatives are the chief challenger in three, Labour in two and the SNP and Plaid Cymru in the other seats. In all seven the UKIP vote was bigger than the Liberal Democrats margin of victory and few UKIP defectors will switch to the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrats are thus likely to lose three of their MPs to the Conservatives.

The Liberal Democrats trailed a sitting MP by less than ten percent in only 16 constituencies. Of these notional marginal seats, 10 are Conservative-held, 3 are Labour and 3 are SNP. While the Liberal Democratic national share of the vote has recovered a bit since two years ago, the Conservative vote has risen even more. The party's best chance of making gains is in seats which voted heavily in favour of remaining in the EU at last year's referendum. A big student population helps the Liberal Democrats too. There are eight constituencies in which more than 60 percent voted for remaining in the EU, the party's distinctive appeal. In Scotland the Liberal Democrats are caught by having to compete with the SNP for voters who put the EU first, and with three other parties that are more firmly Unionist, specially a resurgent Conservative party.

*UKIP vote being cannibalized.* UKIP's political success has undermined its electoral appeal. In campaigning for votes in 2015 it asked voters to send the Conservative-led government a message. Now that the government has adopted much of its message on Europe and on immigration, the party's *raison d'être* is in question. Moreover, Brexit will end the political careers of the 24 UKIP Members of the European Parliament. Political feuding and a rapid turnover of leaders has cost the party candidates too. UKIP is sure to see a big drop in its vote because it is fielding 247 fewer candidates than at the last election.

In the three seats in which UKIP came within ten percent of the winner, all were held by Conservatives. In Labour-held seats in which UKIP is within 15 percent of the sitting MP the Conservatives often finished second, thus giving UKIP voters an incentive to vote for the Conservatives in order to oust a Labour MP. In the great majority of seats in which UKIP polled more than 20 percent of the vote, they are either a distant second or trail behind both the Conservatives and Labour in third place. The chief impact of UKIP will be indirect. At least six of its defectors plan to


vote Conservative for every one defecting to Labour, it will help the Conservatives win several dozen seats from Labour and shore up Conservative defences in seats their MPs held by a narrow margin at the last election.

*For Wales, read England.* The Principality is no longer the Labour heartland that it once was. Although 25 of the 40 constituencies in Wales are Labour held, in seven the party is defending margins of less than nine percent. Like England, party competition is divided between north and south. Third parties, a combination of Plaid Cymru, UKIP, the Liberal Democrats and Greens, collectively took more than one-third of the vote at the 2015 election. The early May poll for the Cardiff University Welsh Governance Centre showed the Conservative support up 14 percent, helped greatly by the collapse of UKIP. The Labour vote was down by 2 percent. No significant change was indicated for the Liberal Democrats and Plaid Cymru (see [blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/electionsinwales](http://blogs.cardiff.ac.uk/electionsinwales)). In the preceding pages the analysis of Welsh seats changing hands has been included along with that of English seats. In the seven marginal seats that Labour is defending, UKIP's above-average showing there in 2015 means Labour is vulnerable to losing six seats to the Conservatives and one is very vulnerable to Plaid Cymru. That would leave Labour in its worst position in Wales in almost a century.

*Scotland will remain different.* In the June general election, the Scottish National Party will retain its position as the biggest party in Scotland by winning the largest share of the vote. With a projected 50 of Scotland's 59 MPs it will also be the third largest party in the Westminster Parliament. Three Scottish surveys in April show that Conservative support has doubled since the last election, albeit from a very low figure of 15 percent in 2015. The SNP vote has gone down an average of 7 percent. Different forms of party competition in Scotland make it unsuitable to apply a national Scottish survey uniformly to every seat. There were only six seats that the SNP is defending in which it a lead of less than 10 percent. The collapse of Labour in Scotland and aggressive campaigning by the Conservatives Scottish leader, Ruth Davidson, will see it replace Labour as the second largest party in terms of Scottish votes and seats.

Half-way through the election campaign, the overall picture is clear: On current figures, Theresa May is headed for a majority of more than 225 seats over Labour and at least 140 seats over all MPs (Figure 4.2). This will be as big a victory as Margaret Thatcher secured in 1983. Unless there is last minute reversal in public opinion, May will have a larger share of the popular vote than Thatcher achieved in winning 397 seats when trouncing Michael Foot in 1983.

Figure 4.2 WHAT IT ALL ADDS UP TO: PARTY SHARE OF SEATS



Sources: Party support in polls current up to 13 May (see Figure 4.1) and author's calculations of seat effects as set out in text.

### 5. THE FALL OUT FROM THE RESULT

\*Whatever the exact number of MPs each party gains, Theresa May is on track to secure what she wants: a majority of MPs committed to her leadership. This will give her support for whatever she decides is a good deal for Britain after confronting European Union leaders with a different mandate for Europe's post-Brexit relations with Britain.

\*The drop in Labour representation will be less significant than what follows. The choice is between keeping Labour on the leftward path that Jeremy Corbyn and those behind him have taken or heading in a direction in which more votes and seats may be won.

\*Liberal Democrats will be anxious spectators of developments beyond their control. To regain significance they will need a big bang event, such as an anti-Brexit backlash or a break up among Labour MPs because of the consequences of the party's move left.

\*As the party with control of the Scottish government, a big plurality of Scotland's Westminster vote and a big majority of its MPs, the Scottish National Party will press on with its demand for a second referendum on independence in the life of the new UK Parliament.

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*19.5.17*

Table A.1. CONSERVATIVE TARGET SEATS

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
1	City of Chester	0.2	<b>Lab</b>	43.1	43.2	5.6	na	na	8.1	na	na	42.7
2	Ealing Central and Acton	0.5	<b>Lab</b>	42.7	43.2	6.1	na	na	3.8	3.6	0.6	28.2
3	Berwickshire, RB and S	0.6	<b>SNP</b>	36.0	4.9	18.7	36.6	na	2.4	1.1	0.2	43.2
4	Ynys Môn	0.7	<b>Lab</b>	21.2	31.1	2.2	na	30.5	14.7	na	0.4	50.9
5	Brentford and Isleworth	0.8	<b>Lab</b>	42.9	43.8	4.0	na	na	5.6	3.7	na	39.5
6	Halifax	1.0	<b>Lab</b>	39.0	40.0	3.7	na	na	12.8	2.6	1.8	60.4
7	Wirral West	1.0	<b>Lab</b>	44.2	45.1	3.4	na	na	6.6	na	0.7	42.8
8	Ilford North	1.2	<b>Lab</b>	42.7	43.9	2.3	na	na	8.9	2.1	0.2	52.6
9	Newcastle-under-Lyme	1.5	<b>Lab</b>	36.9	38.4	4.2	na	na	16.9	2.9	0.7	61.7
10	Barrow and Furness	1.8	<b>Lab</b>	40.5	42.3	2.7	na	na	11.7	2.5	0.3	56.8
11	Wolverhampton South West	2.0	<b>Lab</b>	41.2	43.2	2.1	na	na	10.7	2.6	0.1	53.6
12	Hampstead and Kilburn	2.1	<b>Lab</b>	42.3	44.4	5.6	na	na	2.8	4.4	0.4	23.5
13	Enfield North	2.4	<b>Lab</b>	41.4	43.7	2.3	na	na	9.0	2.8	0.8	47.9
14	Hove	2.4	<b>Lab</b>	39.9	42.3	3.6	na	na	6.3	6.8	1.1	33.9
15	Dewsbury	2.7	<b>Lab</b>	39.1	41.8	3.6	na	na	12.4	2.5	0.6	57.3
16	Southport	3.0	<b>LD</b>	28.0	19.2	31.0	na	na	16.8	2.8	2.2	45.5
17	Lancaster and Fleetwood	3.0	<b>Lab</b>	39.2	42.3	3.3	na	na	9.7	5.0	0.4	50.9
18	Carshalton and Wallington	3.2	<b>LD</b>	31.7	15.0	34.9	na	na	14.8	3.1	0.5	56.3
19	North East Derbyshire	3.9	<b>Lab</b>	36.7	40.6	4.2	na	na	15.9	2.2	0.3	62.2
20	Harrow West	4.7	<b>Lab</b>	42.2	47.0	3.4	na	na	4.4	2.8	0.3	41.4
21	Bridgend	4.9	<b>Lab</b>	32.2	37.1	4.2	na	7.1	15.0	1.9	2.7	49.7
22	Middlesbrough S and EC	5.0	<b>Lab</b>	37.1	42.0	3.4	na	na	15.2	2.3	na	65.0
23	Westminster North	5.0	<b>Lab</b>	41.8	46.8	3.7	na	na	3.8	3.3	0.5	33.0
24	Walsall North	5.3	<b>Lab</b>	33.8	39.0	2.3	na	na	22.0	1.4	1.5	71.9
25	Tooting	5.3	<b>Lab</b>	41.9	47.2	3.9	na	na	2.9	4.1	na	25.3
26	Wrexham	5.6	<b>Lab</b>	31.6	37.2	5.3	na	7.6	15.5	2.0	0.6	57.3
27	Birmingham, Northfield	5.9	<b>Lab</b>	35.7	41.6	3.2	na	na	16.7	2.8	na	57.5

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP(%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
28	Wakefield	6.1	<b>Lab</b>	34.2	40.3	3.5	na	na	18.3	2.5	1.3	62.0
29	Gedling	6.2	<b>Lab</b>	36.1	42.3	4.0	na	na	14.4	3.2	na	56.2
30	Eltham	6.2	<b>Lab</b>	36.4	42.6	3.0	na	na	15.0	3.0	na	52.8
31	Copeland	6.5	<b>Lab</b>	35.8	42.3	3.5	na	na	15.5	3.0	na	59.8
32	Stoke-on-Trent South	6.5	<b>Lab</b>	32.7	39.2	3.3	na	na	21.2	2.6	1.0	70.8
33	Birmingham, Edgbaston	6.6	<b>Lab</b>	38.3	44.8	2.9	na	na	10.1	3.3	0.6	43.2
34	East Renfrewshire	6.6	<b>SNP</b>	22.0	34.0	1.9	40.6	na	1.6	na	na	25.7
35	Leeds North West	6.7	<b>LD</b>	18.6	30.1	36.8	na	na	6.9	7.0	0.6	35.4
36	Clwyd South	6.9	<b>Lab</b>	30.4	37.2	3.8	na	10.3	15.6	2.6	na	60.3
37	Coventry South	7.3	<b>Lab</b>	35.0	42.3	4.1	na	na	13.1	3.9	1.7	48.9
38	Hartlepool	7.7	<b>Lab</b>	20.9	35.6	1.9	na	na	28.0	3.4	10.1	69.6
39	Darlington	7.7	<b>Lab</b>	35.2	42.9	4.8	na	na	13.1	3.5	0.5	58.1
40	Clacton	7.8	<b>UKIP</b>	36.7	14.4	1.8	na	na	44.4	2.7	na	71.1
41	Delyn	7.8	<b>Lab</b>	32.7	40.5	3.7	na	4.8	16.4	1.8	na	54.8
42	Blackpool South	8.0	<b>Lab</b>	33.8	41.8	2.3	na	na	17.3	2.6	2.2	67.8
43	Alyn and Deeside	8.1	<b>Lab</b>	31.9	40.0	4.2	na	3.9	17.6	2.4	na	57.7
44	North Norfolk	8.2	<b>LD</b>	30.9	10.2	39.1	na	na	16.9	3.0	na	58.3
45	Scunthorpe	8.5	<b>Lab</b>	33.2	41.7	2.1	na	na	17.1	2.4	3.5	69.1
46	Bristol East	8.6	<b>Lab</b>	30.7	39.3	5.8	na	na	15.5	8.3	0.5	48.8
47	Newport West	8.7	<b>Lab</b>	32.5	41.2	3.9	na	4.0	15.2	3.2	na	53.0
48	Southampton, Test	8.7	<b>Lab</b>	32.5	41.3	4.9	na	na	12.8	5.9	2.7	50.7
49	Chorley	8.8	<b>Lab</b>	36.3	45.1	2.6	na	na	13.5	2.1	0.3	56.6
50	Bishop Auckland	8.9	<b>Lab</b>	32.5	41.4	4.4	na	na	17.8	3.9	na	60.6
51	Coventry North West	10.0	<b>Lab</b>	31.0	41.0	4.0	na	na	15.7	4.3	3.9	58.7
52	Bolton North East	10.1	<b>Lab</b>	32.8	43.0	2.9	na	na	18.8	2.6	na	57.8
53	Hyndburn	10.3	<b>Lab</b>	31.9	42.1	2.0	na	na	21.3	2.6	na	65.8
54	Bury South	10.4	<b>Lab</b>	34.6	45.1	3.6	na	na	13.3	3.0	0.4	54.5
55	Wirral South	11.0	<b>Lab</b>	37.2	48.2	3.5	na	na	8.9	2.1	na	45.6



Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP(%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
56	Dudley North	11.0	<b>Lab</b>	30.8	41.8	1.3	na	na	24.0	1.4	0.8	69.2
57	Mansfield	11.3	<b>Lab</b>	28.2	39.4	3.5	na	na	25.1	3.1	0.7	70.9
58	Dumfries and Galloway	11.5	<b>SNP</b>	29.9	24.7	1.7	41.4	na	2.3	na	na	45.4
59	Dagenham and Rainham	11.6	<b>Lab</b>	24.4	41.4	1.7	na	na	29.8	1.9	0.8	69.9
60	Batley and Spen	12.0	<b>Lab</b>	31.2	43.2	4.7	na	na	18.0	2.4	0.3	60.4
61	Workington	12.2	<b>Lab</b>	30.1	42.3	4.4	na	na	19.6	3.0	0.5	60.3
62	Stoke-on-Trent North	12.5	<b>Lab</b>	27.4	39.9	2.9	na	na	24.7	2.8	2.2	72.1
63	West Aberdeenshire and K	12.7	<b>SNP</b>	28.8	4.5	21.4	41.6	na	1.8	1.6	0.3	38.6
64	Exeter	13.3	<b>Lab</b>	33.1	46.4	4.3	na	na	9.4	6.5	0.4	44.7
65	Newport East	13.4	<b>Lab</b>	27.3	40.7	6.4	na	3.5	18.4	2.5	1.1	60.3
66	Ellesmere Port and Neston	13.4	<b>Lab</b>	34.3	47.8	3.3	na	na	12.0	2.1	0.5	57.8
67	Great Grimsby	13.5	<b>Lab</b>	26.3	39.8	5.0	na	na	25.0	2.3	1.7	70.2
68	Oldham E and Saddleworth	13.5	<b>Lab</b>	25.9	39.4	12.9	na	na	19.2	2.6	na	57.3
69	Luton South	13.5	<b>Lab</b>	30.7	44.2	7.5	na	na	12.1	2.9	2.5	55.4
70	Hammersmith	13.6	<b>Lab</b>	36.4	50.0	4.6	na	na	4.4	4.4	0.2	31.0
71	Bristol South	14.0	<b>Lab</b>	24.3	38.4	8.7	na	na	16.5	11.5	0.6	49.7
72	York Central	14.1	<b>Lab</b>	28.3	42.4	8.0	na	na	10.1	10.0	1.2	38.5
73	Worsley and Eccles South	14.1	<b>Lab</b>	30.1	44.2	2.6	na	na	18.3	3.0	1.8	61.4
74	Carmarthen E and Dinefwr	14.2	<b>PC</b>	21.2	24.2	2.4	na	38.4	11.1	2.8	na	53.8
75	Penistone and Stocksbridge	14.3	<b>Lab</b>	27.7	42.0	6.3	na	na	22.9	na	1.1	61.3
76	Walsall South	14.4	<b>Lab</b>	32.8	47.2	1.6	na	na	15.6	2.7	na	63.6
77	Brighton, Pavilion	14.6	<b>Gre</b>	22.8	27.3	2.8	na	na	5.0	41.8	0.4	25.7
78	Birmingham, Erdington	14.8	<b>Lab</b>	30.8	45.6	2.8	na	na	17.4	2.7	0.6	57.5
79	Aberdeen South	14.9	<b>SNP</b>	22.8	26.8	4.6	41.6	na	1.8	2.0	0.3	32.3
80	Leeds North East	15.0	<b>Lab</b>	32.9	47.9	5.3	na	na	7.7	5.3	0.9	37.3

Sources: <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/2015-bes-constituency-results-with-census-and-candidate-data/> and <https://secondreading.uk/brexit/brexit-votes-by-constituency/>

Table A.2. LIB DEM SEATS AND TARGETS

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
na	Westmorland and Lonsdale	18.3	<b>LD</b>	33.2	5.4	51.5	na	na	6.2	3.7	na	47.5
na	Ceredigion	8.2	<b>LD</b>	11.0	9.7	35.9	na	27.7	10.2	5.6	na	45.4
na	North Norfolk	8.2	<b>LD</b>	30.9	10.2	39.1	na	na	16.9	3.0	na	58.3
na	Leeds North West	6.7	<b>LD</b>	18.6	30.1	36.8	na	na	6.9	7.0	0.6	35.4
na	Sheffield, Hallam	4.2	<b>LD</b>	13.6	35.8	40.0	na	na	6.4	3.2	0.9	35.9
na	Orkney and Shetland	3.6	<b>LD</b>	8.9	7.1	41.4	37.8	na	4.8	na	na	40.3
na	Carshalton and Wallington	3.2	<b>LD</b>	31.7	15.0	34.9	na	na	14.8	3.1	0.5	56.3
na	Southport	3.0	<b>LD</b>	28.0	19.2	31.0	na	na	16.8	2.8	2.2	45.5
1	Cambridge	1.2	<b>Lab</b>	15.7	36.0	34.9	na	na	5.2	7.9	0.4	26.5
2	Eastbourne	1.4	<b>Con</b>	39.6	7.8	38.2	na	na	11.6	2.6	0.3	57.6
3	Lewes	2.1	<b>Con</b>	38.0	9.9	35.9	na	na	10.7	5.5	na	47.0
4	Thornbury and Yate	3.1	<b>Con</b>	41.0	7.8	37.9	na	na	10.6	2.7	na	53.3
5	Twickenham	3.3	<b>Con</b>	41.3	11.5	38.0	na	na	4.9	4.0	0.3	33.7
6	East Dunbartonshire	3.9	<b>SNP</b>	8.6	12.3	36.3	40.3	na	1.0	1.5	na	26.7
7	Kingston and Surbiton	4.8	<b>Con</b>	39.2	14.5	34.5	na	na	7.3	3.9	0.6	41.6
8	St Ives	5.1	<b>Con</b>	38.3	9.3	33.2	na	na	11.8	6.3	1.1	55.1
9	Edinburgh West	5.9	<b>SNP</b>	12.3	11.7	33.1	39.0	na	1.9	2.1	na	29.0
10	Torbay	6.8	<b>Con</b>	40.7	8.7	33.8	na	na	13.6	3.2	na	62.7
11	Sutton and Cheam	7.9	<b>Con</b>	41.5	11.1	33.7	na	na	10.7	2.1	0.8	51.3
12	Bath	8.1	<b>Con</b>	37.8	13.2	29.7	na	na	6.2	11.9	1.2	31.7
13	Burnley	8.2	<b>Lab</b>	13.5	37.6	29.5	na	na	17.3	2.1	na	66.6
14	Bermondsey and Old S	8.7	<b>Lab</b>	11.8	43.1	34.3	na	na	6.3	3.9	0.6	27.0
15	Yeovil	9.3	<b>Con</b>	42.5	7.1	33.1	na	na	13.4	3.8	na	59.3
16	North East Fife	9.6	<b>SNP</b>	16.3	7.7	31.3	40.9	na	na	3.1	0.7	38.1
17	Caithness, Sutherland and ER	11.2	<b>SNP</b>	6.8	9.0	35.1	46.3	na	2.9	na	na	49.4
18	Colchester	11.5	<b>Con</b>	38.9	16.2	27.5	na	na	12.1	5.1	0.2	51.1

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
19	Cheltenham	12.1	<b>Con</b>	46.1	7.3	34.0	na	na	7.1	5.0	0.5	42.8
20	Cheadle	12.2	<b>Con</b>	43.1	16.3	31.0	na	na	8.3	na	1.3	41.9
21	Berwick-upon-Tweed	12.2	<b>Con</b>	41.1	14.9	28.9	na	na	11.2	3.7	0.2	55.6
22	Ross, Skye and Lochaber	12.3	<b>SNP</b>	6.2	4.9	35.9	48.1	na	1.9	2.5	0.5	43.4
23	Portsmouth South	12.5	<b>Con</b>	34.8	19.5	22.3	na	na	13.4	7.5	2.5	48.9
24	Brecon and Radnorshire	12.7	<b>Con</b>	41.1	14.7	28.3	na	4.4	8.3	3.1	na	51.7
25	Cardiff Central	12.9	<b>Lab</b>	14.7	40.0	27.1	na	5.0	6.5	6.4	0.4	30.4
26	North Devon	13.3	<b>Con</b>	42.7	7.1	29.4	na	na	14.8	5.8	0.3	57.0
27	Wells	13.3	<b>Con</b>	46.1	6.6	32.8	na	na	9.9	4.1	0.4	53.5
28	North Cornwall	13.7	<b>Con</b>	45.0	5.4	31.2	na	na	12.7	4.3	1.4	60.3
29	Gordon	14.9	<b>SNP</b>	11.7	5.9	32.7	47.7	na	2.0	na	na	44.6
30	Hazel Grove	15.2	<b>Con</b>	41.4	17.5	26.2	na	na	12.2	2.6	na	51.4
31	Montgomeryshire	15.8	<b>Con</b>	45.0	5.6	29.3	na	5.2	11.2	3.7	na	56.0
32	Birmingham, Yardley	16.0	<b>Lab</b>	14.0	41.6	25.6	na	na	16.1	1.7	1.0	61.3
33	St Austell and Newquay	16.2	<b>Con</b>	40.2	10.2	24.0	na	na	16.9	4.6	4.1	63.5
34	Argyll and Bute	16.3	<b>SNP</b>	14.9	10.4	27.9	44.3	na	2.5	na	na	39.4
35	Eastleigh	16.5	<b>Con</b>	42.3	12.9	25.8	na	na	15.8	2.7	0.4	54.0
36	Oxford West and Abingdon	16.7	<b>Con</b>	45.7	12.7	28.9	na	na	6.9	4.4	1.4	38.2
37	Bristol West	8.8	<b>Lab</b>	15.2	35.7	18.8	na	na	3.0	26.8	0.5	20.4
38	Bradford East	17.1	<b>Lab</b>	11.3	46.6	29.5	na	na	9.9	2.1	0.5	57.9
39	Berwickshire, RB and S	0.6	<b>SNP</b>	36.0	4.9	18.7	36.6	na	2.4	1.1	0.2	43.2
40	Chippenham	18.2	<b>Con</b>	47.6	8.2	29.4	na	na	10.6	4.2	na	52.3
41	Inverness, N, B and S	18.8	<b>SNP</b>	5.9	7.5	31.3	50.1	na	2.1	2.4	0.7	41.4
42	Hornsey and Wood Green	19.1	<b>Lab</b>	9.3	50.9	31.8	na	na	2.2	5.4	0.4	18.5

Sources: <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/2015-bes-constituency-results-with-census-and-candidate-data/> and <https://secondreading.uk/brexit/brexit-votes-by-constituency/>

Table A.3. SCOTTISH NATIONAL PARTY POSITION

Rank	Constituency	SNP margin (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
1	Edinburgh South	-5.4	<b>Lab</b>	17.5	39.1	3.7	33.8	1.2	4.2	0.4	23.6
2	Orkney and Shetland	-3.6	<b>LD</b>	8.9	7.1	41.4	37.8	4.8	na	na	40.3
3	Dumfriesshire, C and T	-1.5	<b>Con</b>	39.8	14.8	2.7	38.3	2.8	1.6	na	43.9
4	Berwickshire, RB and S	0.6	<b>SNP</b>	36.0	4.9	18.7	36.6	2.4	1.1	0.2	43.2
5	East Dunbartonshire	3.9	<b>SNP</b>	8.6	12.3	36.3	40.3	1.0	1.5	na	26.7
6	Edinburgh West	5.9	<b>SNP</b>	12.3	11.7	33.1	39.0	1.9	2.1	na	29.0
7	East Renfrewshire	6.6	<b>SNP</b>	22.0	34.0	1.9	40.6	1.6	na	na	25.7
8	North East Fife	9.6	<b>SNP</b>	16.3	7.7	31.3	40.9	na	3.1	0.7	38.1
9	Edinburgh North and Leith	9.6	<b>SNP</b>	16.2	31.3	4.5	40.9	1.5	5.4	0.2	19.4
10	Caithness, Sutherland and ER	11.2	<b>SNP</b>	6.8	9.0	35.1	46.3	2.9	na	na	49.4
11	Dumfries and Galloway	11.5	<b>SNP</b>	29.9	24.7	1.7	41.4	2.3	na	na	45.4
12	East Lothian	11.5	<b>SNP</b>	19.5	31.0	2.6	42.5	2.0	2.1	0.3	35.4
13	Ross, Skye and Lochaber	12.3	<b>SNP</b>	6.2	4.9	35.9	48.1	1.9	2.5	0.5	43.4
14	Paisley and Renfrewshire S	12.3	<b>SNP</b>	7.6	38.6	2.2	50.9	na	na	0.6	34.2
15	West Aberdeenshire and K	12.7	<b>SNP</b>	28.8	4.5	21.4	41.6	1.8	1.6	0.3	38.6
16	Aberdeen South	14.9	<b>SNP</b>	22.8	26.8	4.6	41.6	1.8	2.0	0.3	32.3
17	Gordon	14.9	<b>SNP</b>	11.7	5.9	32.7	47.7	2.0	na	na	44.6
18	Edinburgh South West	15.8	<b>SNP</b>	20.2	27.2	3.7	43.0	2.1	3.8	na	26.9
19	Argyll and Bute	16.3	<b>SNP</b>	14.9	10.4	27.9	44.3	2.5	na	na	39.4
20	Rutherglen and Hamilton W	17.3	<b>SNP</b>	7.6	35.2	1.8	52.6	2.3	na	0.6	37.3
21	Ochil and South Perthshire	17.6	<b>SNP</b>	20.7	28.4	2.6	46.0	2.3	na	na	39.3
22	Perth and North Perthshire	17.8	<b>SNP</b>	32.7	8.1	3.8	50.5	2.0	2.1	0.7	40.2
23	Paisley and Renfrewshire N	18.0	<b>SNP</b>	12.3	32.7	2.1	50.7	na	1.4	0.8	36.1
24	Lanark and Hamilton East	18.3	<b>SNP</b>	15.9	30.5	2.2	48.8	2.6	na	na	35.5
25	Moray	18.4	<b>SNP</b>	31.1	9.9	2.8	49.5	3.9	2.7	na	49.9
26	Dunfermline and West Fife	18.5	<b>SNP</b>	11.9	31.7	4.0	50.3	na	2.1	na	40.0

Rank	Constituency	SNP margin (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
27	Inverness, N,B and S	18.8	<b>SNP</b>	5.9	7.5	31.3	50.1	2.1	2.4	0.7	41.4
28	Kirkcaldy and Cowdenbeath	18.9	<b>SNP</b>	9.9	33.4	2.2	52.2	2.3	na	na	41.7
29	Edinburgh East	19.3	<b>SNP</b>	9.9	29.9	2.8	49.2	1.9	6.0	0.2	30.5
30	Glasgow Central	19.5	<b>SNP</b>	6.0	33.1	1.6	52.5	2.0	4.0	0.9	28.0
31	Airdrie and Shotts	19.8	<b>SNP</b>	7.7	34.1	1.5	53.9	2.5	na	0.3	40.1
32	Stirling	20.1	<b>SNP</b>	23.1	25.5	2.7	45.6	na	3.1	na	32.3
33	Midlothian	20.4	<b>SNP</b>	11.9	30.2	2.3	50.6	2.4	2.5	na	37.9
34	Linlithgow and East Falkirk	21.0	<b>SNP</b>	12.0	31.0	2.0	52.0	2.7	na	0.2	41.6
35	Ayr, Carrick and Cumnock	21.6	<b>SNP</b>	19.8	27.3	1.6	48.8	2.5	na	na	43.0
36	Coatbridge, Chryston and B	22.7	<b>SNP</b>	6.3	33.9	1.1	56.6	2.1	na	na	38.7
37	Glasgow North West	23.6	<b>SNP</b>	8.4	30.9	2.7	54.5	na	2.7	0.8	30.0
38	Glasgow South West	24.3	<b>SNP</b>	5.0	32.8	1.0	57.2	2.4	1.2	0.4	39.4
39	Glasgow North East	24.4	<b>SNP</b>	4.7	33.7	0.8	58.1	na	1.6	1.2	37.7
40	Glasgow East	24.5	<b>SNP</b>	6.0	32.4	0.7	56.9	2.6	0.9	0.5	44.0
41	Motherwell and Wishaw	24.7	<b>SNP</b>	7.7	31.9	1.2	56.5	2.7	na	na	37.0
42	Inverclyde	24.8	<b>SNP</b>	10.0	30.3	2.5	55.1	1.6	na	0.5	36.2
43	Glasgow South	25.2	<b>SNP</b>	9.7	29.7	2.1	54.9	na	2.9	0.6	28.7
44	Glasgow North	25.2	<b>SNP</b>	7.9	27.9	2.7	53.1	1.3	6.2	0.9	27.7
45	North Ayrshire and Arran	25.2	<b>SNP</b>	14.8	28.0	1.7	53.2	2.4	na	na	42.3
46	Angus	25.2	<b>SNP</b>	29.0	8.8	2.7	54.2	3.0	2.2	na	48.1
47	Kilmarnock and Loudoun	25.3	<b>SNP</b>	12.5	30.4	1.5	55.7	na	na	na	39.6
48	Na h-Eileanan an Iar	25.7	<b>SNP</b>	7.6	28.6	2.9	54.3	na	na	6.6	44.8
49	Central Ayrshire	26.8	<b>SNP</b>	17.3	26.4	1.8	53.2	na	1.3	na	42.7
50	East Kilbride, S and L	27.3	<b>SNP</b>	11.8	28.3	1.7	55.6	2.0	na	0.5	38.0
51	West Dunbartonshire	27.7	<b>SNP</b>	7.0	31.3	1.6	59.0	na	na	1.0	38.0
52	Glenrothes	29.2	<b>SNP</b>	7.7	30.6	1.9	59.8	na	na	na	46.5
53	Livingston	29.3	<b>SNP</b>	10.3	27.6	2.1	56.9	3.1	na	na	43.8

Rank	Constituency	SNP margin (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	SNP (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
54	Cumbernauld, Kilsyth KE	29.9	<b>SNP</b>	7.9	30.0	2.2	59.9	na	na	na	37.9
55	Aberdeen North	30.5	<b>SNP</b>	12.1	25.9	4.7	56.4	na	na	0.9	43.1
56	Banff and Buchan	31.4	<b>SNP</b>	28.8	5.8	5.1	60.2	na	na	na	54.0
57	Falkirk	32.6	<b>SNP</b>	12.1	25.1	2.0	57.7	3.0	na	na	42.0
58	Dundee West	38.2	<b>SNP</b>	8.6	23.7	2.4	61.9	na	2.7	0.7	41.2
59	Dundee East	39.8	<b>SNP</b>	15.0	19.9	2.9	59.7	na	1.9	0.7	38.3

Sources: <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/2015-bes-constituency-results-with-census-and-candidate-data/> and <https://secondreading.uk/brexit/brexit-votes-by-constituency/>

Table A.4. UKIP VOTE AT RISK

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	UKIP (%)	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	PC (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
1	Clacton	7.8	<b>UKIP</b>	44.4	36.7	14.4	1.8	na	2.7	na	71.1
2	Boston and Skegness	10.0	<b>Con</b>	33.8	43.8	16.5	2.3	na	1.8	1.7	75.0
3	South Thanet	5.7	<b>Con</b>	32.4	38.1	23.8	1.9	na	2.2	1.6	61.6
4	Heywood and Middleton	10.9	<b>Lab</b>	32.2	19.1	43.1	3.3	na	2.3	na	62.2
5	Thurrock	1.1	<b>Con</b>	31.7	33.7	32.6	1.3	na	na	0.7	70.3
6	Castle Point	19.7	<b>Con</b>	31.2	50.9	13.8	1.8	na	2.4	na	72.7
7	Rochester and Strood	13.6	<b>Con</b>	30.5	44.1	19.8	2.4	na	2.9	0.4	63.1
8	Rotherham	22.3	<b>Lab</b>	30.2	12.3	52.5	2.9	na	na	2.1	68.2
9	Dagenham and Rainham	11.6	<b>Lab</b>	29.8	24.4	41.4	1.7	na	1.9	0.8	69.9
10	Rother Valley	15.5	<b>Lab</b>	28.1	23.3	43.6	4.2	na	na	0.8	66.9
11	Hartlepool	7.7	<b>Lab</b>	28.0	20.9	35.6	1.9	na	3.4	10.1	69.6
12	South Basildon and East T	16.9	<b>Con</b>	26.5	43.4	25.2	3.0	na	na	1.9	73.1
13	North Thanet	23.3	<b>Con</b>	25.7	49.0	17.9	3.5	na	3.7	0.3	65.0
14	Hornchurch and Upminster	23.7	<b>Con</b>	25.3	49.0	20.1	2.7	na	2.6	0.3	69.5
15	West Bromwich West	22.1	<b>Lab</b>	25.2	23.9	47.3	1.6	na	2.0	na	69.1
16	Mansfield	11.3	<b>Lab</b>	25.1	28.2	39.4	3.5	na	3.1	0.7	70.9
17	Great Grimsby	13.5	<b>Lab</b>	25.0	26.3	39.8	5.0	na	2.3	1.7	70.2
18	Wentworth and Dearne	32.0	<b>Lab</b>	24.9	14.9	56.9	2.6	na	na	0.7	70.7
19	Sittingbourne and Sheppey	24.6	<b>Con</b>	24.8	49.5	19.6	3.2	na	2.4	0.6	65.8
20	Stoke-on-Trent North	12.5	<b>Lab</b>	24.7	27.4	39.9	2.9	na	2.8	2.2	72.1
21	Doncaster Central	25.0	<b>Lab</b>	24.1	20.7	49.1	4.2	na	na	1.8	66.3
22	Bradford South	17.2	<b>Lab</b>	24.1	26.3	43.4	2.9	na	3.3	na	62.7
23	Dudley North	11.0	<b>Lab</b>	24.0	30.8	41.8	1.3	na	1.4	0.8	69.2
24	Bolton South East	26.8	<b>Lab</b>	23.6	20.3	50.5	2.6	na	2.9	na	63.4
25	Barnsley East	31.2	<b>Lab</b>	23.5	14.6	54.7	3.2	na	na	4.0	70.8
26	Don Valley	20.9	<b>Lab</b>	23.5	25.3	46.2	3.5	na	na	1.6	68.6
27	South West Norfolk	27.7	<b>Con</b>	23.3	50.9	17.3	4.4	na	4.1	na	66.3

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	UKIP (%)	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	PC (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
28	Great Yarmouth	13.8	<b>Con</b>	23.1	42.9	29.1	2.3	na	2.2	0.4	71.5
29	Penistone and Stocksbridge	14.3	<b>Lab</b>	22.9	27.7	42.0	6.3	na	na	1.1	61.3
30	Romford	28.2	<b>Con</b>	22.8	51.0	20.9	2.9	na	2.5	na	67.8
31	Folkestone and Hythe	25.1	<b>Con</b>	22.8	47.9	14.4	8.9	na	5.4	0.7	61.8
32	Stoke-on-Trent Central	16.7	<b>Lab</b>	22.7	22.5	39.3	4.2	na	3.6	7.7	65.0
33	Doncaster North	29.8	<b>Lab</b>	22.6	18.3	52.4	2.5	na	1.9	2.2	72.1
34	North East Cambridgeshire	32.6	<b>Con</b>	22.5	55.1	14.4	4.5	na	3.5	na	69.4
35	Makerfield	29.4	<b>Lab</b>	22.4	19.5	51.8	3.7	na	2.5	na	65.0
36	Kingston upon Hull East	29.4	<b>Lab</b>	22.4	15.9	51.7	6.5	na	2.3	1.2	72.6
37	Blyth Valley	24.0	<b>Lab</b>	22.3	21.7	46.3	5.9	na	3.8	na	59.9
38	Rayleigh and Wickford	32.4	<b>Con</b>	22.3	54.7	12.6	3.0	na	2.9	4.5	67.9
39	Barking	35.5	<b>Lab</b>	22.2	16.3	57.7	1.3	na	2.1	0.4	60.3
40	Sheffield, Brightside and H	34.5	<b>Lab</b>	22.1	11.0	56.6	4.5	na	4.3	1.5	61.4
41	Walsall North	5.3	<b>Lab</b>	22.0	33.8	39.0	2.3	na	1.4	1.5	71.9
42	South Shields	29.3	<b>Lab</b>	22.0	16.6	51.3	1.8	na	4.5	3.9	62.8
43	Sheffield South East	29.5	<b>Lab</b>	21.9	17.4	51.4	5.3	na	2.7	1.3	66.5
44	South Holland and Deepings	37.7	<b>Con</b>	21.8	59.6	12.4	3.0	na	3.2	na	71.2
45	Ashton-under-Lyne	27.6	<b>Lab</b>	21.8	22.1	49.8	2.4	na	3.9	na	63.5
46	Buckingham	42.7	<b>na</b>	21.7	na	na	na	na	13.8	64.5	48.7
47	Bognor Regis and Littlehampton	29.6	<b>Con</b>	21.7	51.3	13.8	9.0	na	4.1	na	64.2
48	West Suffolk	30.4	<b>Con</b>	21.7	52.2	17.5	5.0	na	3.6	na	63.3
49	Barnsley Central	34.0	<b>Lab</b>	21.7	15.0	55.7	2.1	na	2.6	2.9	68.4
50	Houghton and Sunderland S	33.6	<b>Lab</b>	21.5	18.5	55.1	2.1	na	2.8	na	64.7
51	Plymouth, Moor View	2.4	<b>Con</b>	21.5	37.6	35.2	3.0	na	2.4	0.4	68.8
52	Christchurch	36.7	<b>Con</b>	21.5	58.1	9.5	6.6	na	4.3	na	59.9
53	Louth and Horncastle	29.8	<b>Con</b>	21.4	51.2	18.0	4.5	na	3.1	1.8	69.4
54	Ashfield	18.6	<b>Lab</b>	21.4	22.4	41.0	14.8	na	na	0.3	70.6
55	Hyndburn	10.3	<b>Lab</b>	21.3	31.9	42.1	2.0	na	2.6	na	65.8



Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	UKIP (%)	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	PC (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
56	Normanton, Pontefract C	33.6	<b>Lab</b>	21.3	20.8	54.9	2.9	na	na	na	70.8
57	Stoke-on-Trent South	6.5	<b>Lab</b>	21.2	32.7	39.2	3.3	na	2.6	1.0	70.8
58	West Bromwich East	25.3	<b>Lab</b>	21.2	24.9	50.2	2.0	na	1.7	na	67.6
59	Isle of Wight	19.5	<b>Con</b>	21.2	40.7	12.8	7.4	na	13.4	4.5	61.9
60	Bexleyheath and Crayford	21.0	<b>Con</b>	21.0	47.3	26.2	3.0	na	2.2	0.3	65.0
61	Bolsover	26.8	<b>Lab</b>	21.0	24.5	51.2	3.3	na	na	na	70.3
62	Spelthorne	28.8	<b>Con</b>	20.9	49.7	18.6	6.4	na	3.5	0.9	60.3
63	Oldham West and Royton	34.2	<b>Lab</b>	20.6	19.0	54.8	3.7	na	1.9	na	62.7
64	Havant	31.1	<b>Con</b>	20.6	51.7	15.9	6.5	na	5.2	na	62.5
65	Rochford and Southend East	21.7	<b>Con</b>	20.5	46.4	24.7	3.3	na	5.0	na	60.5
66	Wolverhampton South East	31.0	<b>Lab</b>	20.3	22.3	53.3	2.3	na	1.7	na	68.8
67	Dover	12.5	<b>Con</b>	20.3	43.3	30.7	3.1	na	2.6	na	63.1
68	Hemsworth	28.5	<b>Lab</b>	20.2	22.9	51.3	3.2	na	na	2.4	67.5
69	North West Cambridgeshire	32.4	<b>Con</b>	20.1	52.5	17.9	5.7	na	3.5	0.3	57.0

Sources: <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/2015-bes-constituency-results-with-census-and-candidate-data/> and <https://secondreading.uk/brexit/brexit-votes-by-constituency/>

Table A.5. WELSH SEATS

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
1	Gower	0.1	<b>Con</b>	37.1	37.0	3.6	7.1	11.2	2.7	1.2	50.2
2	Ynys Môn	0.7	<b>Lab</b>	21.2	31.1	2.2	30.5	14.7	na	0.4	50.9
3	Vale of Clwyd	0.7	<b>Con</b>	39.0	38.4	2.6	7.1	13.0	na	na	55.9
4	Cardiff North	4.2	<b>Con</b>	42.4	38.3	3.8	4.5	7.7	2.5	0.8	39.1
5	Bridgend	4.9	<b>Lab</b>	32.2	37.1	4.2	7.1	15.0	1.9	2.7	49.7
6	Wrexham	5.6	<b>Lab</b>	31.6	37.2	5.3	7.6	15.5	2.0	0.6	57.3
7	Clwyd South	6.9	<b>Lab</b>	30.4	37.2	3.8	10.3	15.6	2.6	na	60.3
8	Delyn	7.8	<b>Lab</b>	32.7	40.5	3.7	4.8	16.4	1.8	na	54.8
9	Alyn and Deeside	8.1	<b>Lab</b>	31.9	40.0	4.2	3.9	17.6	2.4	na	57.7
10	Ceredigion	8.2	<b>LD</b>	11.0	9.7	35.9	27.7	10.2	5.6	na	45.4
11	Newport West	8.7	<b>Lab</b>	32.5	41.2	3.9	4.0	15.2	3.2	na	53.0
12	Preseli Pembrokeshire	12.3	<b>Con</b>	40.4	28.1	1.9	6.2	10.5	3.6	9.3	55.8
13	Brecon and Radnorshire	12.7	<b>Con</b>	41.1	14.7	28.3	4.4	8.3	3.1	na	51.7
14	Cardiff Central	12.9	<b>Lab</b>	14.7	40.0	27.1	5.0	6.5	6.4	0.4	30.4
15	Aberconwy	13.3	<b>Con</b>	41.5	28.2	4.6	11.7	11.5	2.4	na	53.4
16	Newport East	13.4	<b>Lab</b>	27.3	40.7	6.4	3.5	18.4	2.5	1.1	60.3
17	Vale of Glamorgan	13.4	<b>Con</b>	46.0	32.6	2.6	5.6	10.7	2.1	0.5	52.3
18	Arfon	13.7	<b>PC</b>	13.1	30.3	2.7	43.9	8.5	na	1.5	34.9
19	Carmarthen E and Dinefwr	14.2	<b>PC</b>	21.2	24.2	2.4	38.4	11.1	2.8	na	53.8
20	Carmarthen W and P South	15.0	<b>Con</b>	43.7	28.7	2.4	10.4	11.6	3.2	na	55.4
21	Cardiff West	15.5	<b>Lab</b>	25.2	40.7	4.7	13.9	11.2	3.9	0.4	44.8
22	Montgomeryshire	15.8	<b>Con</b>	45.0	5.6	29.3	5.2	11.2	3.7	na	56.0
23	Cardiff South and Penarth	16.0	<b>Lab</b>	26.8	42.8	5.0	7.4	13.8	3.7	0.6	44.9
24	Clwyd West	17.7	<b>Con</b>	43.3	25.6	3.6	12.2	13.1	na	2.1	52.5
25	Dwyfor Meirionnydd	18.2	<b>PC</b>	22.7	13.5	4.0	40.9	10.8	3.4	4.8	48.4
26	Llanelli	18.4	<b>Lab</b>	14.3	41.3	1.9	23.0	16.3	1.8	1.4	55.5
27	Swansea West	20.0	<b>Lab</b>	22.6	42.6	9.0	6.4	13.5	5.1	0.8	42.7

Rank	Constituency	Maj (%)	Winner	Con (%)	Lab (%)	LD (%)	PC (%)	UKIP (%)	Gre (%)	Oth (%)	Leave (%)
28	Torfaen	21.5	<b>Lab</b>	23.1	44.6	3.4	5.7	19.0	2.0	2.2	60.9
29	Monmouth	23.1	<b>Con</b>	49.9	26.8	5.3	4.0	10.4	3.4	0.2	47.8
30	Rhondda	23.6	<b>Lab</b>	6.7	50.7	1.5	27.0	12.7	1.4	na	61.2
31	Pontypridd	23.7	<b>Lab</b>	17.3	41.1	12.9	11.5	13.4	2.6	1.1	45.8
32	Caerphilly	25.0	<b>Lab</b>	16.6	44.3	2.3	14.6	19.3	2.3	0.4	55.2
33	Neath	25.7	<b>Lab</b>	15.3	43.8	3.2	18.1	16.4	3.2	na	54.2
34	Islwyn	29.4	<b>Lab</b>	15.2	49.0	2.7	10.7	19.6	1.9	1.0	58.9
35	Cynon Valley	30.9	<b>Lab</b>	12.1	47.7	2.7	16.8	16.3	2.6	1.7	57.0
36	Aberavon	33.1	<b>Lab</b>	11.9	48.9	4.4	11.6	15.8	2.3	5.1	60.0
37	Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney	35.2	<b>Lab</b>	10.1	53.9	4.1	9.5	18.7	1.8	2.0	58.4
38	Swansea East	35.8	<b>Lab</b>	15.3	53.0	4.1	10.4	17.2	na	na	62.1
39	Ogmore	37.0	<b>Lab</b>	15.9	52.9	3.0	10.1	15.4	2.1	0.5	59.8
40	Blaenau Gwent	40.1	<b>Lab</b>	10.8	58.0	2.0	9.0	17.9	2.3	na	62.0

Sources: <http://www.britishelectionstudy.com/data-object/2015-bes-constituency-results-with-census-and-candidate-data/> and <https://secondreading.uk/brexit/brexit-votes-by-constituency/>