RESPONSIBLE PARTY GOVERNMENT

IN A WORLD OF INTERDEPENDENCE

Professor Richard Rose FBA

www.cspp.strath.ac.uk

EUROPEAN UNIVERSITY INSTITUTE

Florence

6 March 2013

Prepared for a special issue of West European Politics
dedicated to Peter Mair
DEFINITIONS

RESPONSIVE: Parties react positively to voter preferences

RESPONSIBLE party government:

- Formal control of policy outputs of government
- Effective in delivering what it promises to voters
- Accountable to voters who can sanction it

REPRESENTATION: Parties enact as well as express policies (Cox, 226)

*ASSUMES government has the power to deliver what it promises

But...
INTERDEPENDENCE CONSTRAINS RESPONSIBLE GOVERNMENT

**Past and present**

*Legacy of commitments from the past, e.g. spending, deficits

**European institutions**

*Inherited EU treaty commitments and *acquis communautaire*

**Global trans-nationalism**

*Trans-national pressures from other states and non-state actors*
NATIONAL AND INTERDEPENDENT MODELS OF PARTY GOVERNMENT

A. NATIONAL

[ Electorate—>Party policies—> Governing party—> Policy outputs—>outcomes ]

[ ]

[---------------------------------------------- < Feedback<------------------------------------------]

B. INTERDEPENDENT

[ Electorate—>Party policies—> Governing party—> Policy outputs—> outcomes ]

[ ]

[^Trans-nat'l ^influences^ ]

[ ]

[----------------------------------------< Feedback<------------------------------------------------- ]
A. DENATIONALIZING EFFECT OF EU COUNCIL

27 electorates→Governing parties<--→ Council→Trans-nat’l→Policy outcomes ]
| [ consensus influences ]
| [ ]
| [------< Feedback<------------------------------------------]

B. MULTI-NATIONALIZING EFFECT OF EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT

| 8 multi-national EP Co-decision
161 natl parties→ party groups-----→ vote→ Council→ Policy outcomes ]

[ ]
[------< Feedback<------------------------------------------]
POLICYMAKERS’ SATISFACTION WITH EU OUTPUTS

Source: Estimated from Javier Arrigui and Robert Thomson, “States’ Bargaining Success in the European Union”, Journal of European Public Policy, 16,5, (2009), Figure 2. Average distance, initial position and decision outcome.
TRANS-NATIONAL TECHNOCRACY

EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK

ECB Trans-natl 25 nat National Commission→ influences→ [govts -----→budget outputs ]-----→ Policy outcomes ^ [Sanctions<------Feedback ]
## INSTITUTIONS DEALING WITH INTERDEPENDENCE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Resource</th>
<th>Geographic</th>
<th>Countries N</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Economic</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EBRD</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>Wider Europe</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WTO</td>
<td>Rules</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>157</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>World Bank</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>Money</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Security</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>Guns</td>
<td>Wider Europe</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Interpol</td>
<td>Law, custody</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Political</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Council of Europe</td>
<td>Soft</td>
<td>Wider Europe</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Soft</td>
<td>Wider Europe</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Nations</td>
<td>Semi-soft</td>
<td>Global</td>
<td>193</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTERDEPENDENCE WITHOUT ACCOUNTABILITY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Interdependent</th>
<th>–27 to 190</th>
<th>Trans-nat’l</th>
<th>Trans-natl</th>
<th>Policy outcomes</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>problem</td>
<td>natl govts</td>
<td>institution</td>
<td>influences</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feedback</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

---
DYNAMIC ALTERNATIVES

ROTATION WITHOUT LEARNING

1st   Voters reject established alternatives for government

2nd   New parties make fresh, valence-type appeals—and fail

3rd   Old governing parties form *grosse koalition* cartel

LEARNING FROM FAILURE

1st   Governing party fails, publicizes trans-national causes

2nd   Opposition party promises superior valence, not outcomes

3rd   Media publicizes national and trans-national problems

?  Can ordinary citizens learn?
TESTING THE V.O. KEY HYPOTHESIS: Ordinary People Aren’t Fools

% seeing economic situation as bad

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Region</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>World</td>
<td>75%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Europe</td>
<td>69%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>National</td>
<td>72%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Standard Eurobarometer 78, Brussels: Q A 3.3 et seq.