POPULAR SUPPORT FOR AN UNDEMOCRATIC REGIME
The *CHANGING* Views of Russians

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Intro THE NEED FOR POPULAR SUPPORT
The regimes that rulers supply
Plan of the book

1. DEMOCRATIC AND UNDEMOCRATIC MODELS OF SUPPORT
Mixing support and compliance
Theories of support
Worldwide support for regimes of all kinds

2. CHANGING THE SUPPLY OF REGIMES
Hard and soft coercion
Competition for support
Yeltsin struggles to fill the void

3. PUTIN CONSOLIDATES A NEW REGIME
Repatriating power to the Kremlin
A floating system of parties
Emergence of a party of power

4. INCREASING SUPPORT FOR AN UNDEMOCRATIC REGIME
Support with and without democratization
Dynamics of regime support
A lifetime of learning and re-learning

5. INDIVIDUAL INFLUENCES ON REGIME SUPPORT
Social differences inevitable; their influence is not
Political performance matters
The economy that matters
Combining influences

6. TIME TELLS: THERE IS NO ALTERNATIVE
Stable and variable influences
Expectations of change
Combining context and individual evaluations

7. FINESSING THE CHALLENGE OF SUCCESSION
The problem of term limits
Organizing the right result
Contrasting views of electoral fairness
Influence of unfairness on regime support

8. THE CHALLENGE OF ECONOMIC REVERSAL
Crisis at the top
Vulnerability at the bottom
The economy reverses, support remains high

9. MAINTAINING A REGIME—DEMOCRATIC OR OTHERWISE
Maintaining an undemocratic regime
Challenges
Political support helps undemocratic and democratic regimes
Appendix A: New Russia Barometer samples
Appendix B: Coding of variables

References

TABLES

Table 3.1 Hurdles to Getting on the Duma Ballot
Table 4.1 What Matters for Regime Support: Four Hypotheses
Table 5.1 Limited Influence of Socialization on Support
Table 5.2 Politics Influences on Regime Support
Table 5.3 Economic Influences on Regime Support
Table 5.4 Combining Influences on Regime Support
Table 6.1 Adding Expectations to a Model of Support
Table 6.2 Taking Time into Account: An HLM Analysis
Table 7.1 Evaluation of Fairness of Elections
Table 7.2 Influences on Perceived Election Unfairness
Table 7.3 Effect of Unfairness on Regime Support
Table 8.1 Ups and Downs in Russian Economy after Crises
Table 8.2 Economic Crisis and Regime Support
Table 8.3 Influences on Economic Evaluations
Table 9.1 Political Support and Regime Durability
Table 9.2 Political Support and Preventing Coups
Table 9.3 Political Support and Economic Growth

FIGURES

Figure 1.1 Models of Political Support
Figure 1.2 Democracy Endorsed in both Undemocratic and Democratic Countries
Figure 1.3 Support for Democratic and Undemocratic Regimes
Figure 2.1 Consequences of Perestroika Evaluated
Figure 2.2 New Constitution gets Pessimistic Support
Figure 2.3 Decline of Confidence in President Yeltsin
Figure 3.1 Oil Price Boom During Putin’s Presidency
Figure 3.2 Impact of the Putin Administration
Figure 3.3 Russians Puzzled about What’s Left, Right
Figure 3.4 Nationwide Recognition of United Russia’s Dominance
Figure 3.5 Subjects Support United Russia
Figure 4.1 What Post-Communist Citizens Associate with Democracy
Figure 4.2 Gap between Democratic Demand and Elite Supply
Figure 4.3 Popular Support of Post-Communist Regimes
Figure 4.4 The Kind of Democracy that Russia Needs
Figure 4.5 Trends in Support for the Regime
Figure 4.6 Wide Dispersion in Support for the Regime (landscape)

Figure 5.1 Generations’ Support goes Up and Down Together

Figure 6.1 Russians Adapting to Transformation
Figure 6.2 Economic Change and Evaluations of the Economy
Figure 6.3 Expectation of Suspension of Parliament
Figure 6.4 Differential Impact of Time and Economy, 1992-2009
Figure 6.5 Dynamics of Political Influences, 1992-2009

Figure 7.1 Gap in Approval of Putin and Government
Figure 7.2 Choices Facing Putin: The Public’s View

Figure 8.1 Popular Economic Anxieties, 2009

Figure 9.1 Compliance now Prime Response to Regime Change
Figure 9.2 The Life Space of Russians
Figure 9.3 Oil Price Volatility 2007-2010
Figure 9.4 Resilience of Russia’s Currency Reserve, 2002-2009