

NATIONAL REFERENDUMS AND COMPETING EUROPEAN LEGITIMACIES

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SOURCES OF EU LEGITIMACY

ABSOLUTE VALUES (Wert) LEGAL-RATIONAL

EU treaties and supremacy of EU law

Validated by processes conforming to EU law

INSTRUMENTAL (Zweck)

NOT building Europe but collective action needed

Peace security (1950s, 1989: Germany & neighbours)

Economic performance (1960s, pre -2008)

EU institutions a means not an absolute end

Validated by Output Effectiveness (Scharpf)

NOT WE THE PEOPLE BUT WE THE ELITES

SHIFTING SOURCES OF NATIONAL LEGITIMACY

DECLINE IN ABSOLUTE TRADITIONAL VALUES

Elites no longer free to make treaties with permissive consensus

Corporatist elites can't deliver church members, classes, interests

DECLINE IN INSTRUMENTAL VALUE OF POLITICAL REPRESENTATIVES

Party leaders not trusted to deliver party policies

Politicians no longer trusted as agents of voter preferences

DEMOCRATIC INPUTS INCREASINGLY VALUED

Opinion polls report what people want

Politicians' rhetoric reflects what people want

Effective outputs don't match promises (cf. David Easton)

SALIENT EU POLICIES CREATE BOTH WINNERS & LOSERS

MACRO-ECONOMIC VALUES HAVE MICRO IMPACT

Eurozone: Stable prices. Unemployment, especially youth

Single market: More competition

Macro-economic values produce some micro-losers

MACRO-SOCIETAL CHANGE IMPACTS TRADITIONAL VALUES

Free movement mixes peoples from 28 national societies

Extra-European migration increase mix

National societies become multi-cultural, not European

PRIME MINISTER HAS A GOLDONI PROBLEM: SERVES 2 MASTERS

Elected by and accountable for policies to national electorate

Ex officio member of European Council making collective EU policies

Council has legal-rational legitimacy to act

Median PM of 2 percent of EU population; 23 small states

Accountable for decisions to 27 other PMs + Treaties

REFERENDUMS: A DIRECT DEMOCRACY INPUT TO POLICY

About single policy, not a package of issues in party programme

Directly decisive without politicians, parties as intermediaries

Available at national level in 26 member states; not at EU level


Binary choices are DIVISIVE, not consensual

Anti-EU campaigners can invoke simple values

Pro-EU campaigners may invoke macro benefits

NATIONAL REFERENDUMS SINCE 2004 WITH EU CONSEQUENCES

% anti-EU policy




*Anti-EU vote higher than vote for protest parties

*Since 2014 all six votes reject closer EU integration
Five reject views of Prime Minister qua EC member

*National democratic legitimacy challenges EU legitimacy

REFERENDUMS AS INPUTS TO AN INTERDEPENDENT PROCESS



Votes count, resources decide. Stein Rokkan

EU LEGAL-RATIONAL LEGITIMACY LIMITS REFERENDUM IMPACT

EU STRATEGIES

1. AVOID policies triggering referendum
 - No Turkish membership

 - Differentiated integration: Fiscal Pact not subject to veto

2. CONCEDE
 - Beforehand in preparation for Lisbon Treaty

 - After referendum defeat: Think again 2nd referendums Ireland, DK
Dutch vote on Ukraine

3. POSITIVE RESPONSE
 - Risk averse: Avoid challenge, kick the euro down the road

 - Link policies: Orban's Hungary

 - Sanction by using legal-rational powers: Switzerland, UK

GLOBAL IMPLICATIONS

- * Member states have a democracy surplus and an effectiveness deficit
- * EU has a democracy deficit but legal-rational effectiveness
- * In global system of interdependence without democratic and legal-rational legitimacy both member states and EU have effectiveness deficit

(See R. Rose: "Responsible Party Government in a World of Interdependence",
West European Politics, 2014, 37,2, 253-269).