## REPRESENTING EUROPEANS:

## A PRAGMATIC APPROACH

PROFESSOR RICHARD ROSE

Centre for the Study of Public Policy
University of Strathclyde Glasgow
www.cspp.strath.ac.uk

London School of Economics
6 June 2013

## DEMOCRACY WITHIN MEMBER STATES

*Citizens elect representatives
.EU problem: UK
*Government accountable to representative assembly .EU problem: Italy
*Government accountable to courts EU problem: Portugal. Germany?
*Government needs renewed mandate EU problem: Germany +26 others

## REPRESENTATIVE EU INSTITUTIONS WITH HORIZONTAL CHECKS AND BALANCES

*European Commission represents principle of ever closer Union
*European Council: National governments represent states
*MEPs elected in national constituencies but majority is a trans-national Black/ Red coalition
*Court of European Justice: Represents principle rule of law
*European Central Bank: Represents principle of monetary economics,
WEAK COMMITMENT \& ACCOUNTABILITY TO CITIZENS

## EU COUNCIL MEMBERS REPRESENT ONLY HALF THEIR VOTERS

Vote for governing parties in national election before 2009 EP ballot


## EU CITIZENS NOT DIRECTLY CONSULTED ON TREATIES

(Per cent of citizens in member states not holding treaty referendum)

- Per cent excluded


How views of voters match position of their party on integration


## MEDIAN EUROPEAN HAS A NEUTRAL IMAGE OF EU

Eurobarometer No.77, Autumn, 2012


## MEDIAN EUROPEAN FAVOURS LEAVING EU AS IT IS

European Election Study, 27 country survey,
Q. Some say European unification should be pushed further. Others say it has already gone too far. What is your opinion?


## EU INSTITUTIONS FAVOUR LEAVING CITIZENS UNDISTURBED

EU founded by bargaining among a cosmopolitan elite

Integration by stealth and intergovernmental treaties

Constitutional convention not popularly elected

Nor did Convention want a pan-European referendum

## INTERDEPENDENCE: <br> PRESSURES FOR EU COLLECTIVE ACTION BUT NO CONSENSUS

*Eurozone: High and visible impact BUT disagreements about:
Who pays for fiscal adjustments?
Trade off between deficit reduction and growth?
*Extending EU powers with or without a new treaty?
*Global representation from national capitals or by Brussels?

## LIMITS TO FURTHER INTEGRATION

$\begin{array}{ll}* L e g a l: & \text { UK: } 2011 \text { Referendum Act } \\ & \text { Germany: Federal courts and Parliament? }\end{array}$
*Weak enforcement of existing standards on member states
Corruption: Italy and Greece as well as new members
*Most candidate countries do not meet EU's Copenhagen criteria:
Stable democracy
Corruption
Functioning market economy
*The Stability Pact: Technocracy without Technik?
One not four digit target years

## LIMITS TO REPATRIATION

*The acquis communitaire: an Eternity clause
*Lisbon Treaty offers an Open Door for withdrawal
*UK withdrawal would require a national referendum offering:
Letting go of nurse for a leap in the dark
*Norway shows that while EU membership can be rejected, interdependence cannot

## A PRAGMATIC RESPONSE

*Case by case evaluation of options to deal with specific problems
*Abandon unanimity rule and repressive consensus
*Seek popular approval of new treaties by a pan-European referendum
*Coalitions of the willing:
Many precedents
Immediately, it satisfies both in and out countries
If a new policy works well, laggards can catch up with leaders
*If experience confirms the view of outs, this leads to a looser union

