THE EU'S STRATEGIC RESPONSE TO REFERENDUM CHALLENGES

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REFERENDUMS INCREASING BECAUSE: MULTI-LATERAL POLICIES INCREASING

*Growing interdependence of trade, currency, migration, environment makes national governments more dependent on what other governments do

*Interdependence Increases demand for EU action and domestic salience of EU policies

*In a global system of interdependence, no institution controls such things as climate change, currency exchange rates

*Systemic interdependencies without institutionalization cause EU policies to lose effectiveness, legitimacy (Scharpf)

(See R. Rose, "Responsible Party Government in a World of Interdependence", *West European Politics*, 37,2, 253-269).

PRIME MINISTER HAS A GOLDONI PROBLEM: SERVES 3 MASTERS

- 1. Must serve a Cabinet coalition.
- 2. Accountable to a national electorate
- 3. At EU level belongs to European Council. Big majority small; 2 percent EU population
 - Accountable to 27 other PMs

SUBSIDIARITY STRIKES BACK


*EU has no treaty capacity to call referendums or to prevent them

*Relies on doctrine of acquis to prevent policy repeal, and on European Council members to deliver their national parliaments

*All but two EU member states make provisions for referendums

*Referendums to confirm membership now part of past

*Referendums now national judgments of EU policies



NATIONAL REFERENDUMS ON EU ISSUES SINCE 2005

MOST NATIONAL REFERENDUMS SINCE 2005 CHALLENGE BOTH EU & NATIONAL GOVERNMENT

Direct democracy rejects both EU legal authority and democratic representatives (7) European Constitution: France, Netherlands, 2005 Lisbon Treaty: Ireland, 2008 Migration of workers: Switzerland, 2014 Withdrawal from EU: United Kingdom, 2016 Justice & Home Affairs opt out: Denmark, 2015 Rejects EU-Ukraine association agreement, Netherlands, 2016


Direct democracy rejects EU legal authority, approves democratic representatives (2) Eurozone financial terms: Greece, 2015 Migration quota: Hungary, 2016

Direct democracy confirms elected representatives but EU policy vetoed (2) European Constitution: Spain, Luxembourg, 2005

Direct democracy confirms EU legal authority and democratic representatives (3) Lisbon Treaty: Ireland, second ballot, 2009 Fiscal Pact: Ireland, initial ballot, 2012 Unified Patent Court: Denmark, initial ballot, 2014

NATIONAL REFERENDUMS INPUTS IN A MULTI-LATERAL PROCESS

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EU STRATEGIES FOR COUNTERING REFERENDUM THREATS

Legal Coercion

Restricting migration: Switzerland, 2014 Negotiating Brexit: United Kingdom, 2016

Legal and Instrumental Coercion

Eurozone finance: Greece accepts as lesser evil, 2015 Fiscal Pact: Ireland accepts as there is no alternative, 2012

Main Powers Retained, Secondary Concessions

Anticipatory concessions: Many countries, Lisbon Treaty, 2006–8 Post hoc concessions: Second Irish referendum on Lisbon, 2009 Symbolic concession: Netherlands, Ukraine agreement, 2016

Risk Avoidance: Differential Integration

Assumes laggards will join: Schengen, Eurozone agreements Economic and Fiscal Pact: UK veto avoided; minimum 11 states Home Affairs: Denmark allowed opt outs, 2015

Sustaining Uncertainty to Avoid Conflict Hungarian rejection of EU migrant quota, 2016 ongoing