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Preface

In the tradition of providing investors with timely, incisive and original discussion papers, Toscafund commissioned a detailed report on the likely outcome of the 2015 General Election. This research is the result of our collaboration with Britain's most senior election expert, Professor Richard Rose. The 7 May British general election is interfering with all sorts of calculations about the economy and uncertainty about the outcome compounds the curse. Most of what we read about the election re-affirms uncertainty, as academics and pollsters express their opinions in terms of the probabilities of the Conservatives or of Labour winning.

Professor Rose's report is different: he **does** make a clear prediction of which party will come first. This is not based on projecting poll results. Instead, it follows from a constituency by constituency analysis of how four parties that constitute a third force – UKIP, the Scottish National Party, the Liberal Democrats and the Greens – will result in both the Conservative and Labour parties winning and losing seats in Parliament. Table 3.1 presents Professor Rose's conclusion that while the Conservatives will suffer a net loss of seats and Labour makes a net gain, the Conservatives will end up with more seats than Labour when the final result is announced on Friday, 8th May. More seats than Labour yes, but not a majority and so a hung parliament. Professor Rose points out that those dismissing a minority Conservative government use faulty reasoning. A minority Conservative government can carry a critical mid-May vote of confidence as long as the Labour opposition is **unable** to create a coalition of parties to vote it down. In his conclusion, Professor Rose explains why the latter is not on the cards, rationalising how even without being formally in a coalition with his party the SNP can still allow David Cameron to remain premier, since this best serves its ambition of Devo-Max. Professor Rose ends by discussing how long a so-called hung parliament - a minority Conservative government - can effectively last.

Given these insights into the election outcome, the paper closes with me taking the conclusions reached by Professor Rose and setting out what these are likely to mean for the UK economy and its key performance indicators.

Dr Savvas Savouri

Professor Richard Rose is the most senior practicing election expert in Britain; he co-authored his first two books on the 1959 British general election and has since published more than a dozen books on voting and elections in Britain, Europe and worldwide. As director of the Centre for the Study of Public Policy at the University of Strathclyde, Glasgow he has also published dozens of books on comparative politics and public policy in Europe, the United States and beyond. For details, see www.cspp.strath.ac.uk.

Executive Summary

1. What it takes to win the 7th May UK election: coming first in seats.

Each of 650 seats in the House of Commons is allocated on a first-past-the post basis in a single-member constituency. A plurality of the vote is enough to win a seat and a plurality of seats enough to claim victory. In 2010 the Conservatives won Downing Street with 36 percent of the popular vote and 306 seats, 20 short of an absolute majority. Three-fifths were won with less than half the vote.

The new norm is constituency competition between five or six parties. The parties in first and second place differ between constituencies. In Conservative-held seats, the second- place challenger is more often a Liberal Democrat than a Labour candidate. Shifts in votes are more likely to involve third parties than a straight swing between Conservative and Labour candidates. A majority of seats changing hands in 2015 will involve third-force parties gaining or losing seats.

Since party competition is no longer uniform at the constituency level, national opinion polls no longer provide a reliable guide to an election outcome. Moreover, British opinion polls tend to underestimate the position of the Conservatives, which is stronger in England and especially in the South of England which has most of the marginal seats that Labour needs to win to gain office

The mismatch between seats and votes will be extreme. UKIP can easily win up to 15% of the UK vote and get less than 1% of MPs. The Green Party can win well over 1 million votes and get only 1 MP. By contrast, the Scottish National Party's share of seats will be more than double its share of the national vote.

2. The Conservative and Labour parties will both win and lose seats.

Conservative gains from the Liberal Democrats will significantly offset their losses to Labour. UKIP will cost the Conservatives more votes than seats. Labour gains from the Conservatives will be partially offset by losses to the Scottish National Party which will take more than two dozen seats from Labour. The Green Party will divert votes that Labour would otherwise hope to gain from the Liberal Democrats.

3. The Conservatives will come first in MPs but lack a majority.

With more than 60 seats going to third-force parties, neither the Conservatives nor Labour can win an absolute majority of 326 seats in the House of Commons. The swings and roundabouts of constituency competition will leave the Conservatives with less than 300 seats. The surge in SNP support creates a barrier to Labour getting more than 280 seats. The Scottish National Party should replace the Liberal Democrats as the third largest party in the Commons. Ulster Unionists will be fifth with 10 seats and Sinn Fein and UKIP will compete for sixth place.

4. The morning after: David Cameron will still be Prime Minister.

To win an immediate vote of confidence, the Conservatives need a plurality of MPs and the abstention of third-force parties. A second-place Labour leader will find it difficult to organize an alternative government with demoralized Liberal Democrats and an SNP that has beaten Labour badly in Scotland. A hung Parliament can hang for two years or more.

Professor Richard Rose

1. What it takes to win the UK general election on 7 May

In the British tradition of decision-making, one is enough to make the difference between winning and losing; thus, the party that wins the most seats in the House of Commons is described as the winner. However, winning a plurality (that is, the most seats) is not enough to guarantee the winner an absolute majority in the House of Commons. It is enough to give the party with the most seats the best claim on Downing Street. While there are British precedents for the party with a plurality but not an absolute majority of seats forming a government, not since 1922 has a party coming second in seats formed a government. It was short-lived.

No British government has won an absolute majority of the vote since 1935. Labour won an absolute majority of seats in 2005 with 35.2 percent of the UK vote thanks to the boost that the first-past-the-post system gives to the two strongest parties. It also creates confusion between describing a party doing well in the polls and doing badly in the Commons. Looking only at shares of the national votes, in which the SNP, Plaid Cymru and Ulster parties are invisible, means ignoring the presence of 117 MPs in the House of Commons from Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.

At the 2010 general election the Conservative plurality of votes gave it a lead of 48 seats over Labour; this was enough to make its leader Prime Minister (Table 1.1). A total of 34.9 percent of the vote was cast for third-force parties that had no chance of leading a government. The combined share of the vote of the Conservatives and Labour, the two parties competing to govern the country, was 65.1 percent, the lowest on record since 1832. As the party that came first at the last general election, the Conservatives can lose seats in May 2015 and still remain in control of Downing Street. However, failure to win an absolute majority when Labour was at its worst in three decades implies substantial obstacles to the party doing so in 2015.

Table 1.1 Mismatch between seats and votes

2010 Party	Seats Number	Seats %	Votes %
Conservative	306	47.0	36.1
Labour	258	39.7	29.0
Liberal Democrats	57	8.8	23.0
Ulster Unionists	10	1.5	1.2
Irish Nationalists	8	1.2	0.9
Scottish NP	6	0.9	1.7
Plaid Cymru	3	0.5	0.6
Green	1	0.2	1.0
UKIP	0	0.0	3.1
British National	0	0.0	1.9
Others	1	0.2	1.5

*<http://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research>. Source for all national election statistics: Colin J. Rallings and Michael Thrasher, *British Electoral Facts 1832-2012* (London: Biteback Publishing 2012).*

The fundamental ‘known known’ on which this paper rests is that a British election result is the sum of what happens in 650 separate United Kingdom constituencies. When three or more candidates contest a constituency it becomes more difficult for anyone to get an absolute majority there. At the 2010 election, 433 seats were won with less than half the vote. The winner is the candidate who comes first past the post in the constituency, however small their share of the constituency vote. The Liberal Democrats won Norwich South in 2010 with only 29.4 percent of the constituency vote. At the 2015 general election, the party winning most seats, and therefore the right to claim control of government, is likely to have a smaller share of the national vote than at any election on record.

When three or more parties contest a constituency, competition becomes multi-faceted. Voters are not restricted to a choice between the two parties competing for control of government but can opt for a ‘third force’ candidate who has no chance of coming first. The scale of support for third-force parties today has made the concept of a uniform national swing in votes unsuitable for forecasting which party wins a British general election, because it assumes that the same parties finish first and second in almost every constituency. Were this the case, then support lost by the front-running party would be complemented by an equal gain in the second place party. However, in 2010 the Labour government lost 6.2 percent of the national vote but the Conservatives gained only 3.7 percent.

At the constituency level the second-place candidate in a majority of Conservative-held seats is a Liberal Democrat rather than Labour (Table 1.2). The big nationwide slump in Liberal Democratic support means that most of these seats are no longer marginal seats that the Conservatives could lose. Both parties will gain support from Lib Dem defectors. However, where it is in third place, Labour gaining a disproportionate amount of Lib Dem defectors is very unlikely to give it a big enough boost to take the seat.

Table 1.2 Diversity of challenges to incumbent MPs

	Winner in 2010				
	<i>Con</i>	<i>Lab</i>	<i>LD</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Total</i>
2nd place					
<i>Con</i>	-	147	38	5	190
<i>Lab</i>	137	-	17	5	159
<i>LD</i>	167	76	-	0	243
<i>SNP</i>	0	28	1	0	29
<i>Other</i>	2	7	2	18	29

Source: Constituency results in the 2010 election are calculated from the Electoral Commission’s data base (www.electoralcommission.org.uk/our-work/our-research).

The two parties competing for government now hold the winner and runner up position in only 44 percent of all parliamentary constituencies. The assumption that one party’s loss in votes equals the other party’s gain is empirically incorrect and politically misleading. Survey research shows that the big majority of electors who change their behaviour from one election to the next do not move from Conservative to Labour or vice versa. Instead, Conservative and Labour defectors shift to third-force parties much more than between the two parties of government. Moving in and out of the ranks of non-voters is another alternative. The national share of the vote that each party wins is thus a by-product of the net effect of many changes rather than a simple swing between alternative parties of government.

This paper gives a different picture of the outcome of the forthcoming British general election because it adds up how many seats each party will win and lose in constituencies in which party competition differs. The outcome of the 2015 British general election will not depend simply on how many seats Labour can win from the Conservatives. It will also depend on how many more seats the Conservatives can take from the Liberal Democrats than Labour does and on how many seats Labour loses to the Scottish National Party. Although UKIP is badly placed to win many seats, it can indirectly hurt Conservative MPs by taking more votes from their supporters than from other parties. The next section details the different ways in which third-force parties gain and lose seats, thus having a differential impact on the two major parties. It is followed by an examination of the English battle ground, where the Conservatives are defending an absolute majority of seats. The paper concludes with the prediction that the morning after the election David Cameron will be in Downing Street as the leader of the party with a plurality of MPs. Even though opposition parties will collectively have an absolute majority, they will be divided, some being demoralized by defeat while others seek to extract benefits from a minority government.

2. The ups and downs of third-force parties

While the number of votes changing hands will be affected by what happens between now and Election Day, the first thing clear from opinion polls¹ is: **The direction of change in each party's share of the vote is known.** The Conservatives and Liberal Democrats will be the big losers and UKIP and the Scottish National Party the big winners. The Labour vote will go up, but is hardly likely to meet Ed Miliband's goal of 35 percent. A second known is: The Conservative and Labour parties will both win and lose seats. Each party will win seats from the Liberal Democrats while the Conservatives are most vulnerable to losing seats to Labour and UKIP while Labour is most vulnerable to losing seats to the Scottish National Party. The differential impact of the ups and downs of third-force parties will significantly alter the competitive balance between the two major parties.

The Liberal Democrats will be the biggest loser of both votes and seats. The Liberal Democrats won 23 percent of the popular vote in 2010 by appealing as an alternative to both traditional governing parties. However, by the party becoming a partner in a coalition government that appeal has disappeared and with it more than half the Lib Dem support.

Opinion polls show the Liberal Democratic share of the British vote down by well over half its vote at the last election. Surveys find that those who reported voting Liberal Democratic in 2010 have gone many different ways. While one-quarter say they will remain loyal to the party, one-quarter have defected to Labour, one in eight to the Conservatives, about one-sixth to the Greens and about one-sixth now see UKIP as the protest party. If half of the ex-Lib Dem voters who are now undecided returned to the Lib Dems, the party would get about 9 percent of the national vote. Inasmuch as sitting Liberal Democratic MPs benefit from incumbency, their share of the vote in constituencies they now hold should fall proportionately less than the British average of a fall of 16 percent.

The Liberal Democrats are set to lose well over half of the 57 seats the party won in 2010 (Appendix Table A). The Conservatives are better placed to benefit because they finished second in 38 of these seats, compared to Labour second in 17 seats and a weak third in a great majority of the other seats. Taking into account how defectors divide, the Conservatives would win more than two dozen seats the Liberal Democrats hold by a margin of 16 percent and Labour 10.

¹ A comprehensive list of opinion poll results since 2010 is available at <http://ukpollingreport.co.uk>. When this paper was written, polls showed an average of 33 percent Labour; 33 percent Conservative; 7 percent Liberal Democrat; 15 percent UKIP, 7 percent Green; and 5 percent other parties.

While the collapse of Liberal Democratic support gives Labour a bigger boost in national opinion polls, it gives the Conservatives a bigger boost in seats in the House of Commons. Gaining 20 seats from the Lib Dems would be enough to push the Conservatives to the level of an absolute majority—before subtracting its losses. Even though the Labour Party's total number of MPs increases, it will fall more than ten seats further behind the Conservatives.

UKIP will make the biggest gain in votes but win few seats. UKIP was ignored in the 2010 general election because, even though it contested 558 seats it won only 3.1 percent of the UK vote. The British National Party took 1.9 percent. The combined 5.0 percent of the vote won by the two protest parties provides a base line against which to assess how much the protest vote has risen since.

At the May, 2014 European Parliament (EP) election UKIP pushed its share of the vote up by 11 percentage points from the one-sixth that it won as an anti-European party contesting the 2009 European election. This was sufficient to put it first in the popular vote with 27.5 percent. Under the proportional system in use in EP elections, UKIP now has the biggest share of British Members in the European Parliament. While this is an eye-catching result, it is not a harbinger of its performance in a UK election. Protest parties always do much better at EP elections than at a general election. At the 2014 EP election third-force parties took more than half the British vote and turnout was barely half that at a British general election.

Opinion polls since the middle of the current UK Parliament have consistently shown UKIP having supplanted the Liberal Democrats as third in popularity. In January, 2015 it was endorsed by an average of 15 percent, an increase of 10 percentage points on the combined vote for protest parties at the previous election. Moreover, in autumn, 2014 two Conservative MPs resigned their seats and fought and won by-elections as UKIP candidates, thus giving the party its first seats in the House of Commons.

To treble its support since the last election, UKIP has drawn some support from many parties². Among BES respondents who say they are currently supporting UKIP, only 8 percent had done so in 2010 and another 3 percent had formerly voted for the British National Party. UKIP's rise has not been due to mobilizing people so disillusioned that they did not vote at the last general election. Instead, a big majority have been drawn from established parties. One in three had formerly voted Conservative, one in five were ex-Liberal Democrats dissatisfied with all established parties and one in six have come from Labour. As UKIP's support has grown, its recruits have altered. The proportion of defectors from Labour ranks, while fewer than from the Conservatives, is growing faster. This is consistent with the Nigel Farage strategy of being a populist party rather than making a narrow appeal to right wing electors.

The rocket-like rise of UKIP makes it vulnerable to losing support as quickly as it has gained it. The commitment of nominal UKIP voters is shallow; just under half say they identify with the party while one in three say they still identify with either the Conservative or Labour Party. This low level of party identification contrasts with the firm support shown established parties. Among intending Conservative and Labour voters, seven out of eight identify with their party, as do four in five of those ready to vote for the Liberal Democrats.

Paradoxically, the biggest handicap that UKIP faces is competing for seats in the British electoral system. If British MPs were elected by proportional representation, UKIP would be well placed to win upwards of 100 seats. However, for a third-force party to win seats in Britain's first-past-the-post system, it needs to limit its appeal to a restricted minority of British constituencies, as the Scottish National and the Welsh nationalist parties do. UKIP's support is spread relatively evenly across the country. Unlike the Liberal Democrats, who invested decades in building support in target constituencies, UKIP is a new party without an established base of constituency support. By the conventional measure of marginality, the distance a challenger stands from the winning candidate, there are only four seats in which the combined UKIP and British National vote was within 25 percentage points of the winner at the 2010 general election (see Appendix Table B).

² For a detailed analysis, see Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, *Revolt on the Right* (Routledge, 2014).

A sociological analysis of UKIP supporters finds that they tend to be people who feel left out, as society has changed in the wake of Britain's membership of the European Union, waves of immigration, and the prosperity of an educated elite. In social terms, the party's supporters are older, less educated and more likely to be working-class than are voters for the two major parties. Older voters are more likely to be Conservative, while less educated and working-class Britons have traditionally been Labour voters. Census data identify the constituencies with the largest percentage of people with each of these characteristics. In the 10 constituencies with the most pensioners, 9 are Conservative-held and 1 is held by a Liberal Democrat. By any normal standards, these are safe seats. In all ten, the winner had at least 46 percent of the vote, UKIP did not contest two and did not win more than 8.5 percent of the vote in any. In the 10 constituencies with the most poorly educated electors, Labour holds 9 seats with between 45 and 72 percent of the vote; in eight UKIP's share of the vote ranges from 1.5 to 7.7 percent. It did not contest the one Tory-held seat in this category, Clacton. In the 10 most working-class seats, all are Labour, but two—Walsall North and Great Grimsby—are held with less than two-fifths of the vote.


UKIP's best chances of winning seats are in places where there are special situations. The two obvious examples are Clacton and Rochester, which it won at by-elections as defecting MPs brought with them defecting Conservative voters. The seat Nigel Farage is contesting in Kent is a third special situation; Farage is already a Member of the European Parliament from Kent. Constituency polls by Lord Ashcroft place UKIP ahead in one more Conservative-held seat (www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-29568123). On this basis, UKIP could end up with four MPs in the next House of Commons. This is not enough to constitute a direct threat to the Conservative position in the House of Commons.

The SNP threat to Labour is categorical. A conventional electoral analysis would define Labour as in a strong defensive position in Scotland. At the last general election Labour took 42.0 percent of the Scottish vote, giving it a 22.1 percent lead over the Scottish National Party, which finished just ahead of the Liberal Democrats in the popular vote; the Conservatives trailed in fourth. Labour won 41 seats, the Lib Dems 11, the SNP 6, and the Conservatives 1. While the SNP was the runner-up party in 28 of Labour's seats, in the median constituency it trailed Labour by 32 percent of the vote. However, the political situation in Scotland is no longer conventional.

In the September, 2014 referendum on Scottish independence, the Labour, Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties successfully conducted a joint campaign to reject the proposal. The SNP was the only party that campaigned for independence; 45 percent voted in favour of independence. This was more than double the vote that the SNP polled at the 2010 British general election. Voters who had traditionally voted Labour were the biggest source of additional support for the SNP cause. In Labour's West of Scotland heartland, there was a majority in favour of independence in a significant number of constituencies represented by Labour MPs.

In the four months since the independence referendum opinion polls have raised the prospect of a categorical rather than a marginal change in the position of Labour and the SNP. The SNP is now the favoured party in Scotland and Labour is trailing well behind it in popular support. The Liberal Democrat vote has collapsed even more in Scotland than in England while Conservative support has held steady enough to move it into a weak third place. UKIP shows less than half the strength it registers in England, as the SNP also protests against how Britain is governed, albeit it offers a different alternative to UKIP.

Figure 2.1 Change in party support in Scotland, 2010 - 2015



Note: Average results of three polls taken in January 2015: Survation, Panelbase and IPSOS-Mori

All post-Referendum polls agree on the relative position of the parties, but they vary significantly in the absolute support attributed to the chief contenders. The polls show an 11 percentage point range in SNP support between 41 and 52.5 percent. The January estimates for Labour support range between 24 and 31 percent. The average gives the SNP a 19 point lead over Labour (Figure 2.1). The big SNP lead does not reflect sampling error but the political error that Labour has made in taking its traditional support in Scotland for granted.

While the breakthrough of the SNP is startling when viewed from Westminster, it is consistent with trends in Scotland over more than a decade. Labour has never won more than one-third of the list vote in elections for the Scottish Parliament since it was established in 1999. After two terms of a Labour-Liberal Democrat coalition, in 2007 the SNP replaced it, forming a minority government with 36 percent of the seats. In 2011 the SNP won re-election with an absolute majority of seats and 44 percent of the Scottish vote, almost the same as it now registers for Westminster. Labour came second with 26 percent of the list vote for Members of the Scottish Parliament, almost the same as its current position in the polls. Since then, the former inconsistency between favouring one party for the Westminster Parliament and another party for Edinburgh has almost disappeared to the benefit of the SNP.

The difference between the SNP being on the losing side in the September Referendum and its current lead is due to the contrasting way in which a Referendum and a parliamentary election are decided. Winning a Referendum requires an absolute majority of votes. By contrast, a plurality of votes is sufficient to elect an MP in a Scottish constituency in which many parties compete for votes. When expressing a preference for an MP, the 55 percent that united to vote No in the Referendum divide their support among five different parties. Thus, a response by these parties to the surge in SNP support by stressing the risks of independence is inadequate to topple the SNP, for they disagree about which party to vote for as the government of the United Kingdom. By contrast, there is only one pro-independence party on the ballot; the SNP's opinion poll standing is not significantly different from the vote for independence in the Referendum.

Ironically, the rejection of independence removes the biggest risk that the Unionist camp stressed in the Referendum campaign, the economic disruption of leaving the UK. More Scots are now prepared to see the key issue in a Westminster election as 'Which party can do best for Scotland?' rather than 'Which party is best to govern Britain?'. In England one-third of voters reject the Conservative and Labour alternatives as best able to look after Britain. At this election most of this group are likely to express their dissatisfaction by voting for UKIP. In Scotland the SNP offers the option of changing the question; currently, 46 percent reject all the British parties on the Scottish ballot. Labour's difficulty in presenting itself as both a Scottish and a British party led its Scottish party leader to resign in autumn with the accusation that the party's British leaders wanted to run the party from London. The new Labour leader in Scotland, Jim Murphy, is a Westminster MP without a seat in the devolved Edinburgh Parliament.

As long as the current lead of the SNP is so large, the complexities of constituency competition in Scotland have little effect on its likely gain in seats (Appendix Table C). If the average change in party support shown in Figure 2.1 were uniformly reflected across Scotland at the May general election, then Labour would be reduced to 7 MPs and the Liberals to 1. However a uniform 'national' movement of votes is unlikely because the SNP must jump from third to first place over different challengers in different parts of Scotland. Because the median Labour seat is held with a margin of 31.6 percent over the SNP, any recovery by Labour would reduce the depth to which Labour plunged. After allowing for some variations, the forecast result is that the SNP will take 45 seats and Labour 10. This outcome will not only make the SNP a big party in the House of Commons but also significantly widen the distance that Labour falls behind the Conservative party.

The Green Party: an attractive nuisance from Labour. Even though it won a seat in the House of Commons in 2010, the Green Party was almost invisible nationally, nominating candidates in only half of Britain's seats. Green candidates won an average of 1.8 percent of the vote in constituencies they contested and 1.0 percent of the total British vote. Support for the Greens in current public opinion polls is substantially higher, averaging 7 percent in January, 2015. However, as the Greens do not expect to contest one-quarter of British constituencies, it would do well to get as much as four percent of the vote in May. It could only win a second seat in exceptional circumstances.

Because the Greens favour a wide range of liberal-left issues as well as support for the environment, it is a nuisance to Labour, attracting support from people who might otherwise express their opposition to a Conservative government by voting for the established party of the left. BES surveys indicate that half the current Green support comes from the Liberal Democrats, one in seven supporters from Labour and one in twelve from the Conservatives. Because the Green vote is limited, the net gain for Labour is no more than one-quarter of one percent. The indirect effect is potentially greater insofar as it reduces Labour's gain from Liberal Democratic defectors who choose the Greens rather than Labour's shade of red.

The collective impact. Although UKIP should achieve the biggest gain in popular vote, its visible effect in the House of Commons will be slight because it will have only a handful or thimbleful of MPs (Table 2.1). The impact of the Liberal Democrats will be much greater. Even though most of its MPs are likely to be defeated, the seats the Lib Dems now hold will not disappear but be redistributed. Although Labour will gain a larger share of disaffected Lib Dem voters, the Conservatives will gain more Lib Dem seats, thereby widening their lead. In the division of the total vote, the SNP will hardly be visible; it will compete for fifth place with the Green Party. However, gaining dozens of seats would make the SNP the third largest party in the Commons and leave a strategic hole in Labour ranks on the opposition benches.

Table 2.1 Step by step impact of third force parties

	2015 Seats					
	<i>Con</i>	<i>Lab</i>	<i>Lib D</i>	<i>SNP</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Con lead</i>
2010 seats	306	258	57	6	23	48
2015 (change)						
Liberal Democrats (-44)	332	268	13	14	23	64
UKIP (+4)	328	268	13	14	27	60
SNP (+39)	328	237	13	45	27	91

Note: Calculated from constituency analyses reported in chapter 2.

The Other category will be the most stable, as the 18 Northern Ireland MPs will divide as before --10 supporting the Union and 8 the Republic of Ireland. The remaining others include 4 UKIP, 3 Plaid Cymru, 1 Green and the Speaker.

As the most British party in the House of Commons, Labour is especially hard hit by the rise of the SNP³. Even after allowing for the seats it gains from the Liberal Democrats in England, Labour's losses in Scotland will leave it trailing the Conservatives by a larger number of seats than it did in 2010.

3. England: Conservatives defending on high ground

The Conservative Party will do best from the collective impact of third-force parties. It enters the 2015 election with a plurality of British seats and an absolute majority of English seats, which contribute more than four-fifths of the total number of seats in the Westminster Parliament. Since only 9 of its MPs do not sit for an English constituency, the Conservatives have lead of 106 seats over Labour in England. The division of the popular vote was also different. The Conservatives won 39.5 percent of the English vote, giving them a lead of 11.4 percent over Labour.

To improve on its 2010 showing, the Labour leadership has chosen a strategy of mobilising its traditional core vote. The core Labour vote has been slowly but steadily shrinking over the decades in response to social changes. With Tony Blair as leader, Labour won the 1997 election with 43.2 percent of the vote but it fell 8 percentage points in 2005, sufficient to win re-election thanks to divisions among its opponents. At the last general election, Labour's vote fell another 6 percentage points in competition with the Conservatives and Liberal Democrats. In 2015 the SNP and the Green parties are making fresh inroads on Labour's vote and some traditional Labour voters left behind by social change have been turning to UKIP.

³ Although Labour has 26 of the 40 seats in Wales, there are only 2 constituencies in which Labour's lead over the Welsh Nationalists is less than 25 percent. A December, 2014 poll by the Welsh Governance Centre and ITV found support for the Labour Party and Plaid Cymru exactly the same as at the 2010 general election.

The size of the challenge to Labour. The result of the 2010 election was an unambiguous defeat for Labour; it lost 97 seats and moved from controlling government to opposition with 258 MPs. On that basis, at the May, 2015 election it would need to win 68 seats to regain control of government with an absolute majority. The challenge facing Labour today is to win sufficient seats from the Conservatives to offset the widening Tory lead due to its gains from the Liberal Democrats and Labour's losses to the Scottish National Party. If it won a dozen from the Conservatives this would prevent that party from winning an absolute majority but it would still leave Labour trailing far behind the Conservatives. Reducing its losses to the SNP would also reduce the gap between the two front-running parties, but that too would leave Labour on the opposition benches.

To win a plurality of seats in the new House of Commons, Labour needs to take seats from the Conservatives. Each seat won produces a double benefit: it adds one to Labour's total number of MPs and subtracts one from the Conservatives' plurality. The 2010 result conveys a misleading impression of how many seats Labour needs to gain, because it fails to take into account that while Labour must augment its numbers by taking Conservative seats, the Conservatives can widen their lead by winning seats from the Lib Dems and are much less vulnerable to losing seats to UKIP than Labour is to losing seats to the SNP. On the basis of the calculations in Table 2.1, Labour needs a net gain of 46 seats from the Conservatives to become the largest. In a table ranking Conservative seats by the size of their margin over Labour at the last election, the Conservatives have a lead of 7.2 percent over Labour in their 46th most marginal seat (Appendix Table D).

The conventional way to assess the strength of the major parties is through polls that estimate party support in the whole of Britain. However, the development of separate systems of party competition in England and Scotland means that British opinion polls are no longer suitable to estimate the division of the vote in England. Almost one in seven of poll respondents is Scottish or Welsh and voters there divide differently. In 2010 the Conservatives won 39.5 percent of the vote in England but only 20 percent of the combined vote in the other two nations. In a complementary manner, Labour's 40.1 percent share of the combined Scottish and Welsh vote was 12 percentage points higher than its support in England.

Headline accounts of British polls underestimate Conservative support in England. Currently, polls show Conservative support almost twice as high in England as its support in Scotland and Wales. Thus, the 33 percent attributed to the party in the January average of British polls indicates that in England the Conservative support is about two percentage points higher. This gives it a clear lead over Labour, whose poll support in England is no longer significantly different from its British total because of losing support to the SNP.

In England Labour has historically enjoyed the advantage of needing fewer votes to elect an MP than do the Conservatives, because its seats tend to have smaller electorates and lower turnouts. Moreover, it has wasted fewer votes where the Liberal Democrats have been strong, finishing a weak third. This has reduced its total vote without reducing its share of seats nationally (cf. Tables 1.1, 1.2). The Conservative loss of support in the industrial North of England means that it now wastes fewer votes there because it comes a weak second in many Labour-held seats.

Electoral differences between the North and South of England are consistently reflected in opinion polls. In its Sunday Times poll of 15-16 January, YouGov showed Labour one percent ahead in Britain. However, in the industrial North of England Labour was 13 percentage points ahead, whereas in the South of England excluding London the Conservatives were 12 percentage points ahead of Labour. When the whole of the English electorate is divided in two categories, the South of England and London as against the North and Wales, the Conservatives are 8 percent ahead of Labour in the South, while Labour is 9 percent ahead in the North. Although the electorate divides in almost equal numbers between the north and south, marginal seats are not. About two-thirds of the marginal seats that Labour needs to take from the Conservatives are in the South of England.

In every English marginal seat in which Labour is the second place challenger to a Conservative MP up to three third-force parties are present—the Liberal Democrats, the Greens and UKIP. The indirect impact of Liberal Democrats is limited. Conservative seats are marginal because Labour takes a significant share of the constituency vote too. In 2010 the vote for third-force parties in these marginal constituencies was one-third less than in England as a whole. Insofar as the Liberal Democrats were weak still have a hard core of support, Labour is unlikely to have much of a net addition of much more than one percent to its support, after discounting the defection of some of its support to the Greens.

National evidence showing that UKIP will take more votes from the Conservatives than Labour reflects the fact that in Conservative safe seats some Conservatives can cast a protest vote for UKIP to influence David Cameron without risking that Labour would win the seat. By contrast, in marginal seats there is pressure on Conservative voters who have defected to UKIP during this Parliament to return to the fold at the general election in order to keep Labour from winning the seat. When Lord Ashcroft's polls change their question wording from asking about an individual's general election preference to how they intend to vote in their own constituency, barely half who have defected to UKIP rule out returning to the party that they had supported in the last general election.

Given the tendency of incumbent MPs to lose fewer votes than their party nationally, seats are not lost in the strict order of marginality given in Appendix Table D. Marginal seat polls show that there is substantial variability in Labour's achievement. In eight key marginals in which Labour faces Conservative leads of from 7.1 to 8.5 percent, Lord Ashcroft's December polls found that the Conservatives were ahead in four, one was tied and Labour was ahead in three seats. After taking into account the better showing of the Conservatives in the South of England where most marginal are, incumbency effects and the squeeze on their former supporters to return to the fold, on the basis of evidence now at hand, notwithstanding Labour gaining three dozen seats from the Conservatives in England, the Conservative government will still have a plurality of seats in the House of Commons.

Table 3.1 Combining the ups and downs of parties

	2015 Seats					
	<i>Con</i>	<i>Lab</i>	<i>Lib D</i>	<i>SNP</i>	<i>Other</i>	<i>Con lead</i>
<u>2010 seats</u>	306	258	57	6	23	48
<u>2015 (change)</u>						
Liberal Democrats (-44)	332	268	13	14	23	64
UKIP (+4)	328	268	13	14	27	60
SNP (+39)	328	237	13	45	27	91
Labour from Con (+36)	292	273	13	45	27	19

Note: Calculated from constituency analyses reported in chapters 2 and 3.

Dynamic patterns. The results of polls cited here are based on a counter-factual statement: they ask people how they would vote if an election were held tomorrow. Nonetheless, the accumulation of many such snapshots during the life of a Parliament can yield evidence of the trend in public opinion from one election to the next⁴.

⁴ Unless otherwise noted, the following paragraphs cite the monthly British poll of Ipsos-MORI. Long-term historical patterns can be found in David Butler and Gareth Butler, *British Political Facts* (Palgrave Macmillan, tenth edition, 201), pp. 299-318).

The normal pattern of public opinion in monthly polls during a Parliament is that the party in government enjoys an initial honeymoon in which support rises and this is followed by a mid-term slump. Support for the chief opposition party follows the opposite course; it starts below the government and rises above it by the Parliament's mid-term. A governing party wins re-election if it then regains a substantial amount of its earlier support while the opposition falls as many who had defected to signal dissatisfaction with their previous choice have second thoughts and return to their previous general election choice.

Labour began to pull ahead of the Conservatives in the polls in late autumn, 2010. At the mid-term of the Parliament in November, 2012, it was 14 percentage points ahead of the Conservatives in the polls. However, the mid-term fall in Conservative support did not take it down as far as the last Labour and Conservative governments that were defeated in their re-election bids. Likewise the highest level of support for the current Labour opposition is well below that achieved by Tony Blair or by David Cameron in their successful bids to move from opposition to government.

The rise of UKIP during the current Parliament has introduced a new element, for UKIP's catchall appeal is to disillusioned supporters of all parties. At the mid-term of this Parliament, UKIP was favoured by 3 percent of respondents. As UKIP support in the polls rose by more than 10 percentage points, Conservative support has fluctuated around its mid-term level. This implies that the initial exodus of its supporters has slowed down. By contrast, Labour's support has drifted down by more than ten percentage points from its mid-term high and UKIP and the SNP have benefited more than the Conservatives.

Judging by past precedents, this close to a general election an opposition party heading for victory should be at least five points ahead of the government. This was the case with the Conservative opposition before it won a plurality of seats at the 2010 general election. Five months before Labour won office with an absolute majority in 1997, it had a 13 percentage point lead. This is not the case now: the two parties are neck and neck in England.

Whereas the years between elections give third-force parties an opportunity to capture the attention of voters not firmly attached to a major party, a general election campaign concentrates attention on whether the government will be Conservative or Labour for the next five years. This is a stimulus to those who have drifted to third-force parties, especially UKIP, to vote for a governing party, if only as a lesser evil. Whatever the size of the drop in UKIP support, it will tend to benefit the Conservatives, because more UKIP supporters have been drawn from its ranks.

While an election campaign is not about seizing the moral high ground, the Conservatives have the political high ground; they are the party in government. The Cameron strategy of promising to do something about immigration and about Europe is designed to reduce internal party criticism and win back some UKIP defectors. The erosion of Labour's mid-term lead and the threat of collapse in Scotland has created a public debate among Labour politicians about its strategy and is making it more difficult for Ed Miliband to appear as a prime minister in waiting.

4. The morning after: David Cameron still prime minister

When the final result is declared on Friday 8th May, David Cameron will still be in Downing Street. This is not because the electorate has given his party a big vote of confidence but because it can lose votes and seats without being overtaken by a Labour opposition that is losing seats as well as winning them. How far below 300 seats the Conservatives fall is less relevant than the British principle that one seat is enough to make a party a winner—at least for the time being.

How long David Cameron can remain in Downing Street depends on a combination of conventions, law and politics. The convention that the Queen's government must be carried on means that the prime minister does not leave Downing Street until it is clear who would be moving in. It also dictates that whoever is prime minister will seek a vote of confidence promptly after new Members of Parliament are sworn in. It is in Cameron's interest to call a vote of confidence within a week to ten days of the election. With a plurality of MPs, the Conservatives would remain in office as long as third-force parties abstained in a confidence vote. Under the 2011 Fixed-Term Parliament Act, a vote of no confidence in the government would trigger another general election in June unless MPs who voted against the government could agree within 14 days on the composition of the government that would replace it.

For a second-place Labour Party to gain office it would have to do more than recruit allies from third-force parties to join in a vote of no confidence. It would also have to secure agreement for other parties to join in a positive vote of confidence in a Labour prime minister. Doing the first without doing the second would trigger another general election within weeks.

A Labour attempt to lead some sort of coalition government would face sceptical potential partners. After suffering a major defeat, the Liberal Democrats would not have a leader who could represent the party in negotiations with Labour and MPs who had survived the party's electoral debacle would likely be shy of another coalition. A triumphant SNP could well have sufficient seats to put Labour in office, but to do so after resoundingly trouncing Labour in Scotland would be a volte face. Equally important, it would undermine the SNP's campaign to remain the Scottish government in competition with Labour at the May, 2016 Scottish Parliament election. The friendly noises that SNP leaders are making about Labour policies are part of a campaign to gain support from ex-Labour voters in Scottish constituencies rather than expressing a wish to be seen as a useful accessory to a Labour government at Westminster.

The outcome of a Conservative government winning a vote of confidence by default would be a minority government. A minority government can survive indefinitely. In 1977 the Labour government gained another two years in office by negotiating a pact for Liberal support in exchange for a Devolution Act. From 2007 the SNP held the Scottish government for a full four-year term by building ad hoc majorities on major issues and avoiding votes on issues that would unite its opponents.

In a hung Parliament a minority government can remain in office indefinitely as long as its actions or events do not create a combination of parties that see their interests best served by calling a fresh general election. Winning an initial vote of confidence in the Commons will guarantee at least a year in government. It will take months for a defeated Labour Party to decide who its leader will be and longer still to work out a strategy that it believes would offer victory in a subsequent general election. The Liberal Democrats will likewise spend months deciding on new leadership and even longer to debate the lessons of its coalition partnership with the Conservatives. It would be logical for the SNP to pursue a policy of non-interference in English government (that is, not vote against a Conservative government) as long as it introduced a bill that moved a long way toward its goal of a maximum of devolution. Ulster Unionists have no sympathy with Labour and could shift from passive support to actively casting votes for a Conservative government if it delivered them sufficient benefits.


If the Conservative government calls an EU Referendum in 2017, this will put in suspense any change of government until the result of that Referendum is known. By this time, the Parliament would be at its mid-term and if a Conservative government suffers the usual fate of being unpopular, the opposition parties hoping to benefit from the government's weakness have the option of carrying a vote of no confidence that would automatically trigger a general election.

Dr Savvas Savouri – Discussion – Economic reflections from Professor Rose’s conclusion

I follow on from the conclusion reached by Professor Rose that David Cameron remains at No10 for some time to come, to reflect on what this might mean to Britain’s economy.


Let me begin my economic assessment by saying that in the immediate aftermath of the General Election and even for some time after in fact, the transmission mechanism through which its outcome will impact most is via the reaction of foreign exchange and debt markets, or rather perceptions amongst participants in these towards the UK’s real economic growth and inflation in the wake of the election outcome. And quite frankly it is difficult to imagine how with the backdrop presented earlier either foreign exchange or debt capital markets will be terribly “shocked” by the outcome suggested. This is not to claim there will not be an interregnum after May 8th that sterling and gilts do not come under pressure. My point is that once it quickly becomes clear that a vote of no confidence is not immediate and David Cameron therefore remains Premier, then both sterling and Gilts will track as I suggest next.

Even in the absence of a General Election the pound would almost certainly have weakened further against the dollar during 2015, improving as it did Britain’s competitiveness towards economies whose currencies are pegged or closely linked to the dollar. The pound would have fallen against the dollar in tandem with the date of a UK base rate rise receding into 2016 and indeed beyond, and expectations the FOMC might itself act earlier. For whereas in the past sterling weakness against the dollar would have fuelled inflation concerns, the present reality is that falling fuel and other commodity prices provide a powerful inflation antidote. And whereas I see deflation becoming stubbornly embedded across the euro-zone I see no such threat for Britain. The reason is simple. Pricing and rents are set to continue inflating across Britain’s residential and commercial property markets, and do so widely across the country (the pounds relative weakness against the dollar ‘cheapening’ sterling assets for buyers in dollars or dollar linked currencies). The robust performance of Britain’s real estate marker will be in sharp contrast to performances of property across much of the euro-zone.



Source: ONS, Eurostat, Bloomberg, Toscafund

Whilst it falls relative to the dollar I see the pound strengthening against the euro, many of whose constituent sovereign states face ever more uncomfortable economic conditions and political challenges this year and beyond. Indeed, according to Professor Rose, UKIP’s representation in the next British Parliament will be much weaker than that of protest parties in other EU countries, where proportional representation delivers seats according to the share of the national vote. It is worth remembering that the “Alternative vote” referendum – a categorical demand by the Lib Democrats for their coalition support - held in the UK on May 5th 2011 resulted in a 68% No, on a turnout of 42.2%. And this paper would have quite different conclusions had the result gone the other way.




Source: Bloomberg, Toscafund

Of course if David Cameron remains Prime Minister we would have to consider a referendum on Britain's continued membership of the European Union – a vote which the SNP would not object to - and expectations concerning its likely outcome. On this crucial issue, economic events across mainland Europe will have a considerable bearing, the recent announcement of significant QE testament to how concerned the euro-zone's own monetary authorities are to its economic well-being. To repeat, I have little doubt deflation is becoming entrenched across the euro-zone and a number of the free-standing currencies around continental Europe will by early 2016 have had their interest rates slashed and in turn markedly devalued against the euro, and by implication fallen sharply relative to the pound. Deepening economic troubles across the EU would make the UK's continued presence within it – notably its fiscal contributions - all the more important to those in Strasbourg, Brussels and indeed Frankfurt, whilst also encouraging ever more migration into the UK from economically distressed parts of Continental Europe. Of course whilst the former would strengthen the UK's hand in renegotiating its terms of membership within the EU, the latter would exacerbate the debate on the free movement of labour across it.

Further afield, I see no reason to imagine the outcome anticipated by Professor Rose will alter the positive view of the UK from the vantage points of Beijing, Singapore, Sao Paulo, Kuala Lumpur or elsewhere across the expansive developing world. No country in Europe can boast more ties with China and other emergent economies than Britain, a connection that can only be broken by the most extreme political outcome. And if I were to identify the election outcome which would trigger the most marked change in the direction and speed of Britain's economic growth it would be if May's General Election was followed in a few months by a second general election (as experienced in 1974, when it is important to add that the UK economy was in a far inferior state that it is now). Crucially, after considering the risks faced by third force parties if they combined to vote no confidence in a plurality Conservative government, Professor Rose dismisses a second General Election this year. Labour gaining a plurality of seats, and with it the keys to Downing Street, is also dismissed as an unlikely outcome.

Let me reflect now on the surge predicted by Professor Rose in Scottish National Party representation in the House of Commons. Its strong negotiation position is certain to be used by the SNP to demand a significant transfer of power to Edinburgh - more significant in fact than proposed by the Smith Commission. The avenues I expect the SNP to demand Devo-Eco-Max will be both fiscal and monetary, the former through the retention of tax revenues and the latter via the issuance of "sovereign" debt, or Kilts. And to emphasise there seems little reason to expect a Conservative government resisting SNP demands for greater economic autonomy, given that doing so would give it the tacit support of the SNP for the two years or so that it would take for a major devolution Act to become an Act of Parliament. Now from my economic perspective any development which breaks Britain's one-size-fits-all national tax and centralised budget system is significantly favourable to the overall economy, because it allows greater discretion and variety in making economic policies in different parts of the UK and so to help narrow dispersion in regional growth (Map 1). To make clear I find it most unlikely

that devolution would be confined to Scotland. Whatever devolved powers Scotland was to gain would be demanded and delivered elsewhere across the United Kingdom; including Wales, Northern Ireland, London and other large English regions. Over the coming years I am convinced we will see a greater degree of localised taxation, focused most where spending and income is positionally fixed, and so very much “property based”.



Source: Parliament.uk, Scottish.Parliament.uk, Toscafund

I now return to the potential economic impact of UKIP and its agitation for significant reduction in Britain’s engagement with the EU and in particular the Single Labour Market. According to Professor Rose’s calculations, UKIP will hold at best a handful of seats in the new Parliament. Its greater impact will be felt among the ranks of Conservative MPs who have campaigned for re-election by stressing policies that are UKIP friendly and press their party leader to show that he agrees with them. While no British Prime Minister could get the European Union to accept everything that eurosceptics would like, he will need to come back from Brussels with what can be presented as major gains in order to appease his eurosceptic parliamentary party.


It would be negligent to consider the election and its wake without reflecting on how the likely outcome predicted by Professor Rose would have on the UK’s Gilt market. My view is that the yield compression we have witnessed will remain for some considerable time. I believe it will remain because the UK economy continues to expand at one of the fastest rates across the G8 with inflation below the lower end of the Bank of England’s monitoring range. And I believe Gilt yields will remain at historic lows because the ECB’s considerable QE programme will have the effect of drawing capital into Gilts as it lifts sterling against the euro.

In conclusion let me say that while political uncertainty is real, we should not exaggerate the importance of the upcoming General Election on the direction of travel in the UK economy. In my view its momentum is based on fundamentals that are largely insensitive to the political climate. This is because of the transfer of powers over the years for monetary policy and macro-prudential management to the Bank of England, and the handing over of the audit of growth and public finance data to the Office for Budgetary Responsibility. My favourable view towards the UK economy also takes into account an unfavourable view of the economic fortunes of Continental Europe, which has the effect of making the UK appear all the more favourable as a destination for human and financial capital from Europe and further afield across the emerging world whose corporate seek a European base somewhere economically attractive.

Chart 7: UK workforce, & with forecast




Chart 8: Real GDP's compared, & forecasts




Source: Nomisweb (ONS), Bloomberg, Toscafund

Map 1: UK cities, Real GDP per capita, £000s, 2012-2030



Source: ONS, DCLG, Toscafund

Map 2: UK cities, population, '000s, 2012-2030



Source: ONS, Toscafund

Appendix A: All Liberal Democratic seats by marginality

Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner	2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote
1	0.3	Solihull	42.9	CON	42.6	LAB	8.9	UKIP	5.1
2	0.6	Dorset M Poole N	45.1	CON	44.5	LAB	5.9	UKIP	4.5
3	0.7	Norwich South	29.4	LAB	28.7	CON	22.9	UKIP	14.9
4	0.9	Bradford East	33.7	LAB	32.8	CON	26.8	UKIP	4.6
5	1.4	Wells	44.0	CON	42.5	LAB	7.5	UKIP	4.9
6	2.8	St. Aust & Nwqay	42.7	CON	40.0	LAB	5.9	UKIP	4.2
7	3.0	Brent Central	44.2	LAB	41.2	CON	11.2	OTH	1.5
8	3.0	Somerton & Frome	47.5	CON	44.5	LAB	4.4	UKIP	3.2
9	3.3	Sutton & Cheam	45.7	CON	42.4	LAB	7.0	UKIP	4.1
10	3.7	St. Ives	42.7	CON	39	LAB	8.2	UKIP	5.6
11	4.2	Manchester Withn	44.7	LAB	40.5	CON	11.1	UKIP	1.8
12	4.3	Burnley	35.7	LAB	31.3	CON	16.6	UKIP	11.2
13	4.6	Dunbartonshire E	38.7	LAB	34.1	CON	15.5	OTH	10.5
14	4.7	Chippenham	45.8	CON	41.0	LAB	6.9	UKIP	4.6
15	6.2	Cheadle	47.1	CON	40.8	LAB	9.4	UKIP	2.7
16	6.4	Cornwall North	48.1	CON	41.7	UKIP	4.9	LAB	4.2
17	6.6	Eastbourne	47.3	CON	40.7	LAB	4.8	OTH	2.5
18	6.9	Taunton Deane	49.1	CON	42.2	LAB	5.1	UKIP	3.6
19	7.0	Berwick Upon Twd	43.7	CON	36.7	LAB	13.2	UKIP	6.4
20	7.2	Eastleigh	46.5	CON	39.3	LAB	9.6	UKIP	3.6
21	7.3	Birmham Yardley	39.6	LAB	32.2	CON	19.2	UKIP	8.2
22	7.6	Argyll & Bute	31.6	CON	24.0	LAB	22.7	OTH	18.9
23	8.2	Aberdnsh W & K	38.4	CON	30.3	SNP	15.7	LAB	13.6
24	8.2	Edinburgh West	35.9	LAB	27.7	CON	23.2	OTH	13.2
25	8.3	Torbay	47.0	CON	38.7	LAB	6.6	UKIP	6.7
26	9.3	Cheltenham	50.5	CON	41.2	LAB	5.1	UKIP	2.3
27	9.6	Brecon Radshire	46.2	CON	36.5	LAB	10.5	OTH	2.5
28	11.3	Devon North	47.4	CON	36.0	UKIP	8.4	LAB	5.2
29	11.5	Carshtn & Walli	48.3	CON	36.8	LAB	8.7	UKIP	5.3
30	11.6	Berwick Rox Selk	45.4	CON	33.8	LAB	10.2	OTH	9.2
31	12.4	Redcar	45.2	LAB	32.7	CON	13.8	UKIP	8.0
32	12.5	Hornsy & Wood Gr	46.5	LAB	34.0	CON	16.7	OTH	2.3
33	12.6	Portsmouth South	45.9	CON	33.3	LAB	13.7	UKIP	4.2
34	12.7	Cardiff Central	41.4	LAB	28.8	CON	21.6	OTH	3.4
35	13.2	Kingston & Surbn	49.8	CON	36.5	LAB	9.3	UKIP	2.5
36	13.5	Cambridge	39.1	CON	25.6	LAB	24.3	UKIP	7.6
37	13.8	Southport	49.6	CON	35.8	LAB	9.4	UKIP	5.1
38	13.8	Gordon	36.0	SNP	22.2	LAB	20.1	CON	18.7
39	14.8	Thornbury & Yate	51.9	CON	37.2	LAB	7.0	UKIP	3.5
40	15.1	Colchester	48.0	CON	32.9	LAB	12.3	UKIP	4.4

Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner	2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote
41	15.2	Hazel Grove	48.8	CON	33.6	LAB	12.5	UKIP	5.1
42	15.3	Lewes	52.0	CON	36.7	LAB	5.0	UKIP	5.6
43	16.8	Caith Suth EstRo	41.4	LAB	24.6	SNP	19.2	CON	13.0
44	18.6	Inv Nai Bad Stra	40.7	LAB	22.1	SNP	18.7	CON	13.3
45	19.1	Bermsy Old Swark	48.4	LAB	29.2	CON	17.1	UKIP	3.1
46	20.3	Twickenham	54.4	CON	34.1	LAB	7.7	UKIP	2.6
47	20.5	Bristol West	48.0	LAB	27.5	CON	18.4	UKIP	3.8
48	20.9	Leeds North West	47.5	CON	26.6	LAB	21.0	UKIP	3.2
49	21.8	Ceredigion	50.0	PLAID	28.3	CON	11.6	LAB	5.8
50	22.6	Fife North East	44.3	CON	21.8	LAB	17.1	OTH	14.2
51	22.8	Yeovil	55.7	CON	32.9	LAB	5.2	UKIP	6.1
52	23.4	Norfolk North	55.5	CON	32.1	LAB	5.8	UKIP	5.4
53	23.8	Westmor & Lond	60.0	CON	36.2	LAB	2.2	UKIP	1.6
54	25.2	Bath	56.6	CON	31.4	LAB	6.9	UKIP	2.4
55	29.9	Sheffield Hallam	53.4	CON	23.5	LAB	16.1	UKIP	2.3
56	37.5	Ross Skye & Lcbr	52.6	LAB	15.1	SNP	15.1	CON	12.2
57	51.3	Orkney & Shetlnd	62.0	LAB	10.7	SNP	10.6	CON	10.5

Appendix B: Seats where protest vote least low in 2010

Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner		2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote
1	21.9	Great Grimsby	LAB	32.7	CON	30.5	LD	22.4	UKIP	10.8
2	22.3	Oldham E & Saddl	LAB	31.9	LD	31.6	CON	26.4	UKIP	9.6
3	24.1	Walsall North	LAB	37.0	CON	34.3	LD	13.1	UKIP	12.9
4	24.5	Burnley	LD	35.7	LAB	31.3	CON	16.6	UKIP	11.2
5	25.3	Dudley North	LAB	38.7	CON	37.0	LD	10.5	UKIP	13.4
6	25.5	Norwich South	LD	29.4	LAB	28.7	CON	22.9	UKIP	14.9
7	25.5	Dagham & Rainham	LAB	40.3	CON	34.3	UKIP	14.7	LD	8.6
8	25.9	Stoke South	LAB	38.8	CON	28.4	LD	15.9	UKIP	12.8
9	26.0	Ashfield	LAB	33.7	LD	33.3	CON	22.2	UKIP	7.7
10	26.0	Plymouth Moor Vw	LAB	37.2	CON	33.3	LD	16.9	UKIP	11.2
11	26.8	Derby North	LAB	33.0	CON	31.7	LD	28.0	UKIP	6.2
12	26.8	Stoke Central	LAB	38.8	LD	21.7	CON	21.0	UKIP	12.0
13	27.3	Morley & Outwood	LAB	37.6	CON	35.3	LD	16.8	UKIP	10.3
14	27.7	Rother Valley	LAB	41.0	CON	28.4	LD	17.3	UKIP	13.3
15	27.8	Northampton N	CON	34.1	LAB	29.3	LD	27.9	UKIP	6.4
16	27.8	Plymth Sut & Dev	CON	34.3	LAB	31.7	LD	24.7	UKIP	6.5
17	27.9	Buckingham	CON	47.3	OTH	17.4	UKIP	19.4	UKIP	5.0
18	28.2	Mansfield	LAB	38.8	CON	26.3	LD	15.4	UKIP	9.0
19	28.3	Rotherham	LAB	44.6	CON	16.7	LD	16.0	UKIP	16.3
20	28.7	Don Valley	LAB	37.9	CON	29.7	LD	17.1	UKIP	9.3
21	28.9	Penistn & Stocks	LAB	37.8	CON	31.2	LD	21.1	UKIP	8.9
22	28.9	Bristol East	LAB	36.6	CON	28.3	LD	24.4	UKIP	7.8
23	28.9	Dewsbury	CON	35.0	LAB	32.2	LD	16.9	OTH	7.1
24	29.1	Bradford East	LD	33.7	LAB	32.8	CON	26.8	UKIP	4.6
25	29.1	Telford	LAB	38.7	CON	36.3	LD	15.5	UKIP	9.6
26	29.2	Pendle	CON	38.9	LAB	30.9	LD	20.2	UKIP	9.7
27	29.5	Luton South	LAB	34.9	CON	29.4	LD	22.7	OTH	4.4
28	29.5	Brighton Paviln	OTH	31.3	LAB	28.9	CON	23.7	LD	13.8
29	29.5	Halifax	LAB	37.4	CON	34.0	LD	19.1	UKIP	6.3
30	29.7	Amber Valley	CON	38.6	LAB	37.5	LD	14.4	UKIP	9.0

Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner		2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			<i>Party</i>	<i>% vote</i>						
31	29.9	Ynys Mon	LAB	33.4	PC	26.2	CON	22.5	LD	7.5
32	29.9	Newcastle U Lyne	LAB	38.0	CON	34.4	LD	19.6	UKIP	8.1
33	29.9	Leicester West	LAB	38.4	CON	27.2	LD	22.8	UKIP	8.5
34	30.1	Swansea West	LAB	34.7	LD	33.2	CON	20.8	PC	4.0
35	30.2	Stoke North	LAB	44.3	CON	23.8	LD	17.7	UKIP	14.2
36	30.3	Hartlepool	LAB	42.5	CON	28.1	LD	17.1	UKIP	12.2
37	30.5	Heywd & Middltn	LAB	40.1	CON	27.2	LD	22.7	UKIP	9.6
38	30.6	Watford	CON	34.9	LD	32.4	LAB	26.7	UKIP	4.4
39	30.8	Hull North	LAB	39.2	LD	37.3	CON	13.1	UKIP	8.4
40	30.8	Bradford South	LAB	41.3	CON	29.1	LD	18.3	UKIP	10.5
41	30.8	Stalybrdg & Hyde	LAB	39.6	CON	32.9	LD	17.0	UKIP	8.8

Appendix C: All Scottish constituencies by SNP position

SNP-held seats by majority (descending order)										
Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner		2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote
1	13.6	Moray	SNP	39.7	CON	26.1	LAB	17.1	LD	14.5
2	12.8	Na H-Eileanan An	SNP	45.7	LAB	32.9	IND	9.6	IND	7.5
3	10.5	Banff & Buchan	SNP	41.3	CON	30.8	LAB	14.0	LD	11.3
4	9.1	Perth & N Pshire	SNP	39.6	CON	30.5	LAB	16.4	LD	12.3
5	8.6	Angus	SNP	39.6	CON	30.9	LAB	17.2	LD	10.8
6	4.5	Dundee East	SNP	37.8	LAB	33.4	CON	15.2	LD	10.6

Seats held by other parties by majority over SNP (ascending order)										
Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner		2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote
7	10.3	Ochil & S Perths	LAB	37.9	SNP	27.6	CON	20.5	LD	11.4
8	12.7	Argyll & Bute	LD	31.6	CON	24.0	LAB	22.7	SNP	18.9
9	13.8	Gordon	LD	36.0	SNP	22.2	LAB	20.1	CON	18.7
10	15.4	Falkirk	LAB	45.7	SNP	30.3	CON	11.2	LD	10.3
11	19.6	Dundee West	LAB	48.5	SNP	28.9	LD	11.4	CON	9.3
12	21.5	Ayrshire N & Arr	LAB	47.4	SNP	26.0	CON	15.6	LD	10.0
13	22.0	Inv Nai Bad Stra	LD	40.7	LAB	22.1	SNP	18.7	CON	13.3
14	22.2	Aberdeen North	LAB	44.4	SNP	22.2	LD	18.6	CON	12.4
15	22.2	Caith Suth EstRo	LD	41.4	LAB	24.6	SNP	19.2	CON	13.0
16	22.5	Livingston	LAB	48.5	SNP	25.9	LD	11.1	CON	10.8
17	22.7	Aberdnsh W & K	LD	38.4	CON	30.3	SNP	15.7	LAB	13.6
18	22.8	Edinburgh West	LD	35.9	LAB	27.7	CON	23.2	SNP	13.2
19	23.0	Edinburgh East	LAB	43.4	SNP	20.4	LD	19.4	CON	10.9
20	24.4	Linlith & E Falk	LAB	49.8	SNP	25.4	LD	12.8	CON	11.9
21	24.5	Stirling	LAB	41.8	CON	23.9	SNP	17.3	LD	14.5
22	24.7	Aberdeen South	LAB	36.5	LD	28.4	CON	20.7	SNP	11.9
23	26.4	Midlothian	LAB	47.0	SNP	20.6	LD	17.1	CON	11.9
24	26.6	Kilmarnck & Loud	LAB	52.5	SNP	26.0	CON	14.2	LD	7.3
25	27.1	Edinburgh S W	LAB	34.7	CON	34.0	LD	21.6	SNP	7.7
26	27.3	Dumf Clyde Tweed	CON	38.0	LAB	28.9	LD	19.8	SNP	10.8
27	27.8	Edinburgh N Leit	LAB	37.5	LD	33.8	CON	14.9	SNP	9.6
28	28.2	Dunbartonshire E	LD	38.7	LAB	34.1	CON	15.5	SNP	10.5
29	28.5	E Kilb Strat Lsm	LAB	51.5	SNP	23.0	CON	13.0	LD	9.9
30	28.6	East Lothian	LAB	44.6	CON	19.7	LD	16.9	SNP	16.0
31	28.7	Ayrshire Central	LAB	47.7	CON	20.4	SNP	19.0	LD	11.9
32	29.0	Lanark & Hamil E	LAB	50.0	SNP	21.0	CON	15.0	LD	11.3
33	29.1	Ayr, Carr & Cnck	LAB	47.1	CON	25.5	SNP	18.0	LD	9.3
34	30.2	Fife North East	LD	44.3	CON	21.8	LAB	17.1	SNP	14.2
35	30.7	Edinburgh South	LAB	42.8	LD	24.3	CON	18.0	SNP	12.2

Seats held by other parties by majority over SNP (ascending order)										
Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner		2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote
36	31.6	Glasgow South	LAB	51.7	SNP	20.2	LD	11.8	CON	11.5
37	32.6	Glasgow North	LAB	44.5	LD	31.4	SNP	11.9	CON	7.1
38	33.4	Cumb Kils Kirk E	LAB	57.2	SNP	23.8	LD	9.5	CON	8.3
39	33.6	Dumfries & Gway	LAB	45.9	CON	31.63	SNP	12.3	LD	8.8
40	34.5	Glasgow Central	LAB	52.0	SNP	17.5	LD	16.4	CON	7.1
41	34.6	Airdrie & Shotts	LAB	58.2	SNP	23.6	CON	8.7	LD	8.1
42	35.0	Paisley & Renf N	LAB	54.0	SNP	19.1	CON	14.6	LD	10.5
43	35.6	Dunferm & W Fife	LAB	46.3	LD	35.1	SNP	10.6	CON	6.8
44	36.2	Berwick Rox Selk	LD	45.4	CON	33.8	LAB	10.2	SNP	9.2
45	36.8	Glasgow East	LAB	61.6	SNP	24.7	LD	5.0	CON	4.5
46	37.5	Ross Skye & Lcbr	LD	52.6	LAB	15.1	SNP	15.1	CON	12.2
47	38.4	Inverclyde	LAB	56.0	SNP	17.5	LD	13.3	CON	12.0
48	38.8	Glasgow North W	LAB	54.1	LD	15.8	SNP	15.3	CON	9.9
49	40.6	Glenrothes	LAB	62.3	SNP	21.7	LD	7.7	CON	7.2
50	41.2	Dunbartonshire W	LAB	61.3	SNP	20.1	LD	8.1	CON	7.7
51	41.5	Paisley & Renf S	LAB	59.6	SNP	18.1	CON	9.9	LD	9.5
52	41.9	Renfrewshire E	LAB	50.8	CON	30.4	LD	9.2	SNP	8.9
53	43.0	Motherwel & Wisw	LAB	61.1	SNP	18.2	LD	9.8	CON	9.4
54	44.7	Ruthgl & Hamil W	LAB	60.8	SNP	16.1	LD	12	CON	9.7
55	46.2	Glasgow South W	LAB	62.5	SNP	16.3	LD	9.0	CON	6.6
56	49.8	Coat Chry Bellhl	LAB	66.6	SNP	16.9	LD	8.5	CON	8.1
57	50.2	Kirkcaldy & Cowd	LAB	64.5	SNP	14.3	LD	9.3	CON	9.3
58	51.4	Orkney & Shetlnd	LD	62.0	LAB	10.7	SNP	10.6	CON	10.5
59	54.2	Glasgow North E	LAB	68.4	SNP	14.1	LD	7.7	CON	5.3

Appendix D: Conservative-held seats; 100 most marginal

Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner		2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote
1	0.1	Warwickshire N	CON	40.2	LAB	40.1	LD	11.6	UKIP	7.3
2	0.2	Camborn & Rothrth	CON	37.6	LD	37.4	LAB	16.3	UKIP	5.1
3	0.2	Thurrock	CON	36.8	LAB	36.6	LD	15.3	UKIP	10.7
4	0.2	Hendon	CON	42.3	LAB	42.1	LD	12.4	UKIP	2.1
5	0.3	Oxford W & Abidn	CON	42.3	LD	42.0	LAB	10.6	UKIP	2.7
6	0.4	Cardiff North	CON	37.5	LAB	37.1	LD	18.3	OTH	3.3
7	0.4	Sherwood	CON	39.2	LAB	38.8	LD	14.9	UKIP	6.6
8	0.7	Stockton South	CON	38.9	LAB	38.3	LD	15.1	UKIP	6.0
9	0.7	Broxtowe	CON	39.0	LAB	38.3	LD	16.9	UKIP	5.0
10	0.8	Lancaster & Flee	CON	36.1	LAB	35.3	LD	19.1	OTH	4.4
11	0.9	Truro & Falmouth	CON	41.7	LD	40.8	LAB	9.6	UKIP	3.9
12	1.1	Newton Abbot	CON	43.0	LD	41.9	LAB	7.0	UKIP	6.4
13	1.2	Amber Valley	CON	38.6	LAB	37.4	LD	14.4	UKIP	9.0
14	1.5	Waveney	CON	40.2	LAB	38.7	LD	13.3	UKIP	5.2
15	1.7	Wolverhampton SW	CON	40.7	LAB	39.0	LD	16.0	UKIP	3.7
16	2.0	Harrogate & Knar	CON	45.7	LD	43.8	LAB	6.4	UKIP	4.1
17	2.0	Morecambe & Ldle	CON	41.5	LAB	39.5	LD	13.3	UKIP	4.2
18	2.0	Carlisle	CON	39.3	LAB	37.3	LD	15.6	UKIP	4.9
19	2.2	Stroud	CON	40.8	LAB	38.6	LD	15.4	UKIP	2.7
20	2.3	Weaver Vale	CON	38.5	LAB	36.3	LD	18.6	UKIP	4.7
21	2.3	Lincoln	CON	37.5	LAB	35.2	LD	20.2	UKIP	5.2
22	2.6	Watford	CON	34.9	LD	32.4	LAB	26.7	UKIP	4.4
23	2.6	Plymth Sut & Dev	CON	34.3	LAB	31.7	LD	24.7	UKIP	6.5
24	2.8	Dewsbury	CON	35.0	LAB	32.2	LD	16.9	OTH	7.1
25	2.8	Warrington South	CON	35.8	LAB	33.0	LD	27.5	UKIP	3.0
26	3.0	Bothford	CON	38.9	LAB	35.9	LD	19.9	UKIP	4.2
27	3.1	Brighton Kemptn	CON	38.0	LAB	34.9	LD	18.0	UKIP	5.5
28	3.4	Pudsey	CON	38.5	LAB	35.1	LD	20.8	UKIP	5.7
29	3.5	Corby	CON	42.2	LAB	38.7	LD	14.4	UKIP	4.7
30	3.5	Montgomeryshire	CON	41.3	LD	37.8	OTH	8.3	LAB	7.1
31	3.6	Brentfd & Iswth	CON	37.2	LAB	33.6	LD	23.7	UKIP	2.9
32	3.7	Hove	CON	36.7	LAB	33.0	LD	22.6	UKIP	5.2
33	3.8	Enfield North	CON	42.3	LAB	38.5	LD	12.2	UKIP	4.9
34	4.0	Hastings & Rye	CON	41.1	LAB	37.1	LD	15.7	UKIP	5.4
35	4.4	St. Albans	CON	40.8	LD	36.4	LAB	17.6	UKIP	3.8
36	4.4	Ipswich	CON	39.1	LAB	34.7	LD	18.2	UKIP	5.6
37	4.6	Halesow & Row Re	CON	41.2	LAB	36.6	LD	14.8	UKIP	6.4
38	4.6	Nuneaton	CON	41.5	LAB	36.9	LD	15.3	UKIP	6.3
39	4.8	Gloucester	CON	39.9	LAB	35.2	LD	19.2	UKIP	3.6
40	4.8	Northampton N	CON	34.1	LAB	29.3	LD	27.9	UKIP	6.4
41	5.0	Bury North	CON	40.2	LAB	35.2	LD	17.0	UKIP	7.0

Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner		2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote
42	5.1	Kingswood	CON	40.4	LAB	35.3	LD	16.8	UKIP	5.9
43	5.1	Weston-Super-Mre	CON	44.3	LD	39.2	LAB	10.9	UKIP	4.8
44	5.1	Herefrd & S Hefs	CON	46.2	LD	41.1	LAB	7.2	UKIP	5.4
45	5.2	Wyre Forest	CON	36.9	OTH	31.7	LAB	14.3	LD	11.9
46	5.2	Erewash	CON	39.5	LAB	34.2	LD	17.5	UKIP	6.7
47	5.3	Blackpl N Cleve	CON	41.8	LAB	36.5	LD	13.3	UKIP	7.9
48	5.4	Devon W & Torrgge	CON	45.7	LD	40.3	UKIP	6.9	LAB	5.3
49	5.4	Winchester	CON	48.5	LD	43.1	LAB	5.5	UKIP	2.0
50	5.5	Chester, City Of	CON	40.6	LAB	35.1	LD	19.1	UKIP	2.6
51	6.0	Croydon Central	CON	39.5	LAB	33.5	LD	13.2	OTH	6.5
52	6.1	Worcester	CON	39.5	LAB	33.4	LD	19.4	UKIP	5.3
53	6.2	Keighley	CON	41.9	LAB	35.8	LD	14.8	UKIP	7.2
54	6.2	Wirral West	CON	42.5	LAB	36.3	LD	16.8	UKIP	2.3
55	6.5	Cornwall S E	CON	45.1	LD	38.6	LAB	7.1	UKIP	6.2
56	6.5	Bristol N W	CON	38.0	LD	31.5	LAB	25.9	UKIP	2.3
57	6.8	Dorset West	CON	47.6	LD	40.7	LAB	6.7	UKIP	3.8
58	6.9	Richmond Park	CON	49.7	LD	42.8	LAB	5.0	UKIP	1.1
59	6.9	York Outer	CON	43.0	LD	36.1	LAB	17.1	UKIP	3.9
60	7.0	Cannock Chase	CON	40.1	LAB	33.1	LD	17.0	UKIP	8.3
61	7.1	Loughborough	CON	41.6	LAB	34.5	LD	18.3	UKIP	5.7
62	7.1	Harrow East	CON	44.7	LAB	37.6	LD	14.3	UKIP	1.9
63	7.2	Warwick & Leamtn	CON	42.6	LAB	35.4	LD	18.3	UKIP	1.9
64	7.5	Swothon South	CON	41.8	LAB	34.3	LD	17.6	UKIP	4.3
65	7.9	Ealing Ctl Acton	CON	38.0	LAB	30.1	LD	27.6	UKIP	1.6
66	8.0	Pendle	CON	38.9	LAB	30.9	LD	20.2	UKIP	9.7
67	8.0	Stevenage	CON	41.4	LAB	33.4	LD	16.6	UKIP	6.8
68	8.1	Elmet & Rothwell	CON	42.6	LAB	34.5	LD	16.3	UKIP	6.1
69	8.5	Carm W & Pem S	CON	41.1	LAB	32.7	LD	12.1	OTH	10.4
70	8.5	Romsy & Shamtn N	CON	49.7	LD	41.3	LAB	6.4	UKIP	2.6
71	8.7	Colne Valley	CON	37.0	LD	28.2	LAB	26.4	UKIP	5.5
72	8.8	Vale Of Glamorgn	CON	41.8	LAB	32.9	LD	15.2	OTH	5.5
73	9.1	Dumf Clyde Tweoth	CON	38.0	LAB	28.9	LD	19.8	OTH	10.8
74	9.2	Norwich North	CON	40.6	LAB	31.4	LD	18.3	UKIP	6.2
75	9.3	High Peak	CON	40.9	LAB	31.6	LD	21.8	UKIP	3.4
76	9.3	Bosworth	CON	42.8	LD	33.5	LAB	16.0	UKIP	6.5
77	9.4	Chelmsford	CON	46.2	LD	36.8	LAB	11.0	UKIP	4.4
78	9.4	Milton Keynes S	CON	41.6	LAB	32.2	LD	17.7	UKIP	6.4
79	9.5	Rosdale & Darwen	CON	41.8	LAB	32.2	LD	18.1	UKIP	3.4
80	9.6	Cleethorpes	CON	42.1	LAB	32.6	LD	18.2	UKIP	7.1
81	9.6	Somerset N E	CON	41.3	LAB	31.7	LD	22.3	UKIP	3.4
82	9.9	Great Yarmouth	CON	43.1	LAB	33.2	LD	14.4	UKIP	8.1
83	10.1	Dudley South	CON	43.1	LAB	33.0	LD	15.7	UKIP	8.2

Rank	Maj %	Constituency	Winner		2nd place		3rd place		4th place	
			Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote	Party	% vote
84	10.3	Totnes	CON	45.9	LD	35.6	LAB	7.4	UKIP	7.3
85	10.3	Cambridgesh S E	CON	48.0	LD	37.6	LAB	7.6	UKIP	3.7
86	10.5	Dover	CON	44.0	LAB	33.5	LD	15.8	UKIP	5.7
87	10.8	South Ribble	CON	45.5	LAB	34.7	LD	14.1	UKIP	5.7
88	10.8	Peterborough	CON	40.4	LAB	29.5	LD	19.6	UKIP	6.7
89	10.9	Stafford	CON	43.9	LAB	33.0	LD	16.3	UKIP	5.6
90	10.9	Stourbridge	CON	42.7	LAB	31.7	LD	16.4	UKIP	8.1
91	11.2	Harlow	CON	44.9	LAB	33.7	LD	13.7	UKIP	7.6
92	11.3	Aberconwy	CON	35.8	LAB	24.5	LD	19.3	OTH	17.8
93	11.5	Ilford North	CON	45.7	LAB	34.2	LD	12.7	UKIP	5.2
94	11.6	Preseli Pembro~e	CON	42.8	LAB	31.2	LD	14.5	OTH	9.2
95	11.7	Tewkesbury	CON	47.2	LD	35.5	LAB	11.6	UKIP	4.1
96	11.7	Brigg & Goole	CON	44.9	LAB	33.1	LD	14.6	UKIP	7.4
97	11.8	Crewe & Nantwich	CON	45.8	LAB	34.0	LD	15.0	UKIP	4.8
98	12.0	Maidstone & Weal	CON	48.0	LD	36.0	LAB	9.7	UKIP	3.3
99	12.2	Battersea	CON	47.3	LAB	35.1	LD	14.7	UKIP	1.1
100	12.3	Canterbury	CON	44.8	LD	32.5	LAB	16.1	UKIP	3.9

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